We historically had several issuance reduction in the past, before 1559 burn and at various price actions.
Keeping Ethereum long term relevant and credibly neutral are our best allies to get people to build on and use Ethereum. The timing for this kind of discussion is never ideal and postponing is accepting the change will be harder. Accepting to go through this in a civilized and constructive manner will make Ethereum even more relevant as a global standard because it clearly signals we are mature enough to deal with hard problems.
Would you agree the risk of staking tends towards zero as the staking ratio grows because the credibility of slashing events on large actors arguably disappears?
Even at constant ratio, the state of the affairs is nothing like it was back in Dec. 2020 when we kickstarted the PoS. Multiple sorts of staking derivatives cover your operational and opportunity cost risks. Staking software and infrastructure are much more mature too.
Good question! I think I covered it already in this previous answer and a few others.
Regarding the tax ambiguity, I think I dealt with it in this post,
Let me quote it:
If everyone prefer the usage of “Penalties” instead of “Burn” this is something I wouldn’t see us (the authors) being stubborn about.
We looked at tapering on concentration or custody, and the obstacle is that the protocol cannot observe either. Any rule keyed to an operator’s share is defeated by splitting into identities the chain cannot tell apart, and Anders’ analysis of targeting mechanisms shows they hand stakers a cartelisation lever such as coordinate to reduce stake, drive your own yield up.
So I think these are two instruments for two jobs. The taper acts on quantity, which the protocol can measure. Composition needs tools that do not require identity, and there I agree with you: correlation penalties, inclusion lists, MEV burn. I would rather see those ship alongside than instead of EIP-8363 and AFAIK those tools are very much underway.
Let me know if I addressed your concerns
Would you rather be supportive of a curve that keeps the previous one until say 45% at stake and starts applying the tapering rather aggressively afterwards?
That would notably come with the trade-off of high sensitivity of the yield to the ratio in the tapering range.
Lido Contributors’ View on EIP-8363 and Issuance Change
EIP-8363 proposes a significant change to Ethereum’s staking issuance policy. This post sets out our view on the process, the proposal itself, and the broader question of how issuance reform should be considered.
We want to be clear at the outset: Lido DAO has a direct economic interest in Ethereum staking and, although contributors do not speak for the DAO, our predominant interest as users of Ethereum and holders of ETH is the long-term security and viability of the network, and this has been reflected in the commitment that Lido has shown to be the most secure and decentralized staking solution at scale. We hope that the arguments below are evaluated on their merits.
We are not opposed to supporting potential Ethereum staking and/or issuance changes. Our concern is moving toward concrete monetary policy update proposals before the broad consequences and second and third order effects have been sufficiently explored — especially the impact on validator-set composition, resulting stake distribution, DeFi, and the long-term security and value of the network.
1. On the process
Lido contributors have tried to engage constructively in the issuance discussion. Ethereum should be able to discuss difficult monetary-policy questions openly, including whether the current issuance curve creates long-term risks.
However, our understanding was that any issuance change would first go through an effort to build broader alignment around the main properties of the proposed update: what problem is being solved, what objectives are being optimized for, what trade-offs are acceptable, and how the impact on validators, DeFi, solo stakers, and staking-market structure should be assessed.
That is not what happened here. Instead, a specific EIP with a concrete and novel issuance curve was published and then proposed for Hegota shortly before the PFI deadline, without sufficient feedback from a wide range of relevant stakeholders or enough time for the ecosystem to review the proposed changes and their effects – instead, creating both a sense of dire urgency while leaving only a few months to deliberate a proposal with broad and deep effects, which are not well understood.
Furthermore, the public engagement so far has not produced a clear, usable review record. Material concerns have been raised across different venues, but the process has not consistently collected them, summarized them fairly, or shown which ones have been resolved and which remain open. Feedback should not be treated as valid only when it appears in a preferred channel or format, and super-long (most probably AI generated) replies that can not be easily parsed should not be treated as resolving concerns simply because a response exists.
For a proposal of this scope, the process should make it easy for the ecosystem to understand which material objections have been raised, how the proposal responds to them, and which questions remain open. Otherwise, high-volume discussion can create the appearance of review without giving stakeholders a practical way to evaluate whether the concerns have actually been addressed.
For a drastic change on Ethereum’s monetary policy that is not a sufficient process. For these reasons, we hold that EIP-8363 should not be seriously considered for CFI in Hegota; instead, it should be re-approached from a broader base and with clear objectives, explicit trade-offs and well-understood consequences, a process in which we are happy to participate (and aid in the facilitation of, especially given the importance of participation by node operators, both those operating at home and professional organizations).
2. The mechanism needs deeper incentive review
EIP-8363 raises several unresolved mechanism design questions that should be answered before it is treated as a robust long-term issuance policy. The proposal has not yet shown — or explicitly acknowledged as an acceptable trade-off — how this curve affects validator composition, capture resistance, network resilience, and ETH’s long-term value under realistic staking-market costs and stakeholder preferences.
Driving real staking returns below zero
In an attempt to address the risk of extreme staking participation, EIP-8363 proposes an issuance curve that we do not believe is suitable for a permanent monetary policy. The staking rewards drop too low as stake rate grows and reach zero when total staking participation reaches 50% of all ETH supply.
The concern is not only whether Ethereum ever reaches exactly 50% (or any threshold set) staked, but that it creates a tipping point where real returns for operators (after costs, taxes) fall close to or below zero, so that decentralization-preserving, independent, higher-cost, and public-good-oriented participants are pushed out of the staking market. This incentivizes well-capitalized actors, especially those able to stake or offer staking for reasons beyond direct returns, to push the staking ratio close to that level, even temporarily, compress rewards for everyone, and force out higher-cost participants. If such a scenario materializes, Ethereum may be forced into another monetary-policy change later, although at that point the damage may already be done; that is exactly what a long-term issuance policy should try to avoid.
Any candidate issuance curve should preserve a meaningful incentive for additional participants to stake in response to concentration risk and should be reviewed rigorously against academic and empirical work on incentives, market structure, and strategic staking behavior before being treated as a robust long-term policy for Ethereum.
Lower stake does not guarantee better resilience
Reducing the staking ratio is not itself a decentralization or recovery strategy. What matters is the medium- and long-term composition of the validator set and the intermediation level of ETH in the market: who remains staking, who is discouraged from joining later, and where staked and unstaked ETH resides.
Large custodians, institutions, and professional staking platforms may continue staking even at much lower reward levels because staking is part of a broader custody, product, regulatory, or customer-retention strategy. If that happens, the ease and likelihood of a serious attack (e.g. via fork choice or attestation manipulation) may increase, and thus also the necessity of a social-slashing scenario would increase, not decrease. Putting the network in a state where social slashing becomes more likely to be necessary than otherwise means setting up a failure scenario for the network from a credible neutrality standpoint.
Lower staking participation also does not automatically reduce intermediation. If reduced rewards make solo staking and decentralized staking solutions less viable, a higher portion of remaining staked ETH may end up with custodians or other intermediated products. Moreover, a significant amount of hence unstaked ETH will likely seek forgone yield through riskier, custodial platforms as well, ultimately leading to the total amount and proportion of intermediated ETH increasing, not decreasing. In that scenario, the moral-hazard problem does not disappear; it may simply move from the staking layer to broader ETH custody.
These effects should be modeled, not assumed away. EIP-8363 has not yet shown that lowering aggregate stake leads to better validator composition, easier recovery from attacks, lower capture risk, or even better “ETH as money” under realistic market behavior.
3. Ecosystem Effects
Monetary-policy change does not happen in isolation. Issuance economics shape the kind of staking market Ethereum gets. If issuance is reduced aggressively (especially without taking into account the sustainability of participants, which is denoted in fiat, not ETH, terms) the staking market becomes a race to the bottom. Over time, that favors scale: the largest, cheapest, and best-capitalized operators are best positioned to survive, while higher-cost participants are pressured out. This will directly lead to worse client diversity, greater geographic concentration, and infrastructure centralization - all factors that erode Ethereum’s resilience.
This also affects positive externalities around staking which Ethereum currently enjoys. The current issuance rate supports a diverse ecosystem exactly because it allows participants (and in the case of delegated staking, users who select them) who believe in increasing Ethereum’s resilience and decentralization to express this preference: public goods funding (e.g. client teams), independent node operators running infrastructure in underserved geographies benefiting users around the world, security researchers, and on-chain staking protocols that invest in tooling, redundancy, and public-good work beyond the direct act of validating.
If Ethereum compresses staking economics too far, the staking market will increasingly optimize for cost over time, favoring on the long-term scale, centralization, and cost-minimized operators over diversity, redundancy, and public-good stewardship. That is a choice Ethereum can make, but it should make it explicitly and with full awareness of what gets selected out.
4. Suggested path forward
Issuance reform should be based on clear broadly agreed objectives, serious risk review, and a process that takes all major consequences into account. EIP-8363 does not yet meet that standard, and we do not believe that the time allotted for deliberation between now and Hegota CFI is sufficient to bridge this gap or to address the serious concerns around the curve proposed.
Ethereum should take seriously all risks related to staking and its monetary policy. But the response should be scoped to the problem being solved:
- If the urgent concern is excessive staking participation, a better path would be to study a narrower high-staking safeguard: define the dangerous staking range, model acceptable validator/operator composition around that range, and then evaluate targeted mechanisms to mitigate this specific risk. Issuance update may be one tool of such mechanisms but not the only one: they could include consensus layer mechanisms that introduce constraints on further stake growth, such as entry queue constraints, stake capping (naively or via something like Orbit). Such a narrower safeguard could be developed as a standalone EIP and considered, for example for I*, allowing Ethereum to address the specific excessive-staking risk without turning it into a rushed decision on the entire long-term issuance policy.
- The broader monetary-policy questions, including the “overpay for security” question, ETH’s monetary premium, and long-term supply policy, should be discussed separately, honestly, and in the spirit of finding broad community alignment. Setting a permanent monetary policy requires broader expertise than protocol research alone, including input from economists, financial modeling experts, DeFi stakeholders, staking operators, and solo stakers before Ethereum converges on a concrete hard-fork proposal.
We can’t post links, so I’ll paste in the text from a Tom Lee X post, since it sounds like you haven’t seen it. It already says this is not specific to any proposal, but I want to make that clear, he’s not specifically talking about this EIP. Still, it’s informative of his views generally. I also acknowledge that these views are not shared by some other treasuries.
FWIW, I hold BMNR, ETH ETFs, and I’m a home solo staker. I’m aligned with the motivations of the EIP. I think the most important thing is not a particular yield at all; it’s maintaining a credible social consensus layer as a backstop, which we start to lose as stake rate continues to climb.
—
Tom Lee Apr 28, 2026:
”The staking issuance for ETH should reflect the actual cost of staking (security model, etc)
A market-based mechanism might make sense and could be lower than the current yield.
So, we are not opposed to idea that the staking issuance rate could change.
PS: please don’t interpret our statements as favoring or endorsing any specific idea.
PPS: This will also create opportunities to generate yield away from native staking”
And by posting the link here you made it even easier, thank you.
Joseph Chalom’s posted a 1,286 comment against this EIP. It’s too much to post here, but here’s one sample passage:
That is what lets ETH into investment mandates requiring a return profile rather than just a directional view on asset appreciation. It is a critical reason why tens of billions of dollars of investor sentiment has flowed into ETH through ETPs, DATs, and private funds. The world’s largest investors and their clients believe in the long term Ethereum opportunity and express that view by buying ETH. They expect capital appreciation plus native yield.
Tom Lee’s statement that you quote doesn’t really explain anything. He’s simply saying issuance could change, it could be lower but it also could be higher. He also says issuance should support the amount of security it pays for. His idea of how much that’s worth might be different from what the authors here believes.
If we look at the economic realities of BMNR, you’ll note a few things:
- BMNR is running out of money. It is issuing preferred shares to raise funds. “Bitmine preferred $BMNP pays dividends weekly - funded natively from $ETH staking yield” – says one of BMNR’s more recent tweets. BMNR needs the yield to keep the flywheel going.
- Tom Lee almost always talks about staking revenue in his investor presentations. It is hard to imagine he would want to tell his investors right now that yield could be going away.
- MAVAN stakes not just BMNR’s Ethereum but it is also looking to stake for other institutional clients.
The elephant in the room is Ethereum is slipping away from capturing upside of DeFi? Think of it this way:
- Blockspace wasn’t as valuable as we previously thought. By now majority of cryptocurrency activities are in Hyperliquid Perps. Based on their node docs they could be dumping ~100 GB/day (actual number is going to be lower) which could be $150k-$1m in just blob paid. Note that this is ~10x the network capacity. Even Lighter which is L2 built for perps is still trailed behind Hyperliquid. (Note: I have Google Search’s Gemini done the math on this)
- Restaking blows. It’s nearly 3 years from Eigenlayer released their token now and yet we still only see few AVS active and making money back to restakers. They pivoted into AI stuff now. Many ecosystem just pivoted away from restaking and their competitor, Symbiotic is focusing on RWA instead.
- Are people treating plain ETH as… bad? It shouldn’t just be one token before you deposit to Lido or lend to Aave. I don’t know how to frame this but it should be currency for everything on ETH and L2.
As for solo stakers stuff, if they think it’s not enough they should go up the risk curve A) Use Lido CSM/Rocketpool. B) Stake on Stakewise to tokenize and lever up C) Sell call on Derive. And for future proposal maybe we should put more revenue stream/duties on validators so they can make money.
The authors of the EIP claim that the current issuance curve forces solo stakers out:
Pintail expands on the logic behind this here:
In the motivation section of EIP-8363 and the issuance discussion more generally (e.g. issuance.wtf), “real return” or “real yield” is often used to mean nominal staking yield minus ETH supply growth. A much better term for this, that’s sometimes used as well, is dilution-adjusted yield. In economics, real yield has a standard meaning: it’s the nominal rate adjusted for price inflation of a basked of goods, not for supply growth of the asset.
- Dilution adjusted-yield is a supply-share metric that answers “how does my fraction of all ETH change”?
- Real yield is a purchasing power metric that answers “how does my ability to buy goods and services change?”
Conflating these two leads to statements like “solo stakers have negative real yield” when what’s actually shown is “solo stakers share of ETH supply shrinks”. A falling share of total ETH does not automatically mean that the value of their position, measured by what it can buy in goods and services, is falling too.
What matters for the long‑run viability of solo staking is real return in their consumption currency after tax and costs, not just their percentage of the ETH supply. A world with negative dilution-adjusted yield can still have positive real returns. Conversly, a world with positive dilution-adjusted yield could still have negative real returns. To make the EIP’s claim that “solo stakers are forced out” rigorous, you would need to model not only after-tax staking income and cost structure of solo staking but also ETH’s expected price dynamics relative to fiat as well as fiat inflation, to then show that solo staker’s real returns fall below what is needed to cover costs and justify risk. Showing that dilution-adjusted yield goes negative alone doesn’t establish that conclusion.
To see how reductionist a pure dilution-adjusted-yield argument can be, consider a holder of unstaked ETH in the snail-issuance world. For staking ratios above 0% and below 50%, annual issuance is positive, so a holder of unstaked ETH has negative dilution-adjusted yield (up to -0.5%). If you treat “dilution-adjusted yield <= 0” as sufficient to make a position untenable, you are saying that it is irrational to hold unstaked ETH whenever the staking ratio is above 0% and below 50%. Taken seriously, that logic pushes you toward an equilibrium in which either:
- no ETH is staked and there is no issuance or
- more than 50% of ETH is staked and there is no issuance
To be clear, my position is that “dilution-adjusted yield <= 0” is not a relevant threshold for viability of a position, and I reject both that solo stakers are forced out under the current issuance curve as well as that snail issuance automatically leads to 0 issuance, based on a dilution-adjusted yield argument alone. I would ask the authors to either:
- retract their claim that solo stakers are forced out under the current issuance curve or
- provide an argument for it that doesn’t rely solely on dilution-adjusted yield or
- clearly communicate in the EIP that under their world-view snail issuance will lead to zero issuance as an expected outcome
The problem of negative dilution adjusted yields is that they drive solo stakers to disappear due to exponential growth. Any population that grows at a smaller rate than the total population for sufficiently long it becomes a rounding error. That’s just the nature of exponential growths.
Claude has candidly prepared this visualization. Unfortunately solo stakers today do not have the benefit of starting at 60% of the total stake.

(Going against my previous policy here and answering your comments before others since we are going to speak publicly on a podcast today as I want to make sure you know where I stand on the matters you raised)
Indeed and this is a distinction the proposal doesn’t model, ie. the stake an attacker must destroy to revert finality and the per-slot revenue you’d have to outbid to influence what gets included are different quantities. The one you’re measuring ($1 to $5m per day) are likely by far the smaller one.
For the sake of clarity we are talking about two different security budgets here. First, the big one, that is the stake an attacker has to destroy to revert finality (that’s the one the EIP defends, the “$30B” figure). Second, the much smaller one is what it costs to sway which transactions make it into blocks, slot by slot. The EIP argues about the first type of budget and doesn’t address the second (the much smaller) one. Measuring it the way you did, per-slot revenue, with the operator’s own cut smaller still is the good initial way to size it IMO.
I think this is coming back to the previously asked cascade model from Stani. I once again call for a collaboration with the different impacted venues who are the most knowledgeable on the matter as indeed good public resources are far from available. Do note that even if those variables were not modeled, they were nevertheless taken in consideration in our reflexion.
I’m still sceptic on Nakamoto-style coefficient but happy to take it in consideration in a future Monitoring and Response section with operator-count metric, entry, maintenance costs and such.
That being said, I don’t necessarily agree on what follows from your numbers. If liveness and inclusion are bought at the per-slot rate, then paying validators more doesn’t buy more of them because a censoring operator paid double still censors, and today’s curve (which spends several times your figure) funds exactly the operator set and the relay market we have now. The instruments that actually bind that failure mode are inclusion lists and distributed validation but not the level of the reward.
Do you agree? If so, I read your budget arithmetic as an argument that issuance is the wrong tool for the day-to-day failure modes in both directions (both more issuance or less issuance).
The tapering prices two thing issuance does govern, the quantity of stake and the dilution funding it while FOCIL and DVT govern what you’re measuring. For the record, I support both, without conditions, and I’m glad you’re reviving anti-correlation penalties.
I will deal with the quote from CelticWarrior in your post later on and it deserves its own answer rather than a clause here.
Thanks, that answers the tax point. If the deduction lands in the same state transition as rewards and penalties, before anything is withdrawable, then it is netting rather than income followed by expense, and my objection there does not hold.
The incidence point I still think is open. The curve you floated to gregk keeps the current schedule to 45% and tapers hard after. That changes when the taper bites, not who it lands on. A home staker and a custodial pool at the same aggregate ratio still pay the same rate, so the lever is still keyed to total staked rather than to the thing the decentralisation argument actually cares about.
I am not claiming concentration is easy to measure on-chain. It probably is not. But if it is not measurable, that is worth saying plainly in the Rationale, because the current framing reads as if the aggregate ratio is a proxy for concentration when it is only a proxy for total yield demand.
EIP-8363 is fundamentally an anti home staker change. Compared to professional node operators, home stakers can’t achieve the same level of performance and uptime. Empirically, this can be seen by looking at https://beaconcha.in/entities :
- Rocket Pool is heavily relying on home stakers and has a beaconscore of ~96.1% over the last 90 days.
- Similarly, entities tagged as “solo stakers” in hildobby’s dune dashboard have an average beaconscore < 96.5%.
- Entities relying on professional operators like Lido, Binance and Etherfi achieve significantly higher beaconscores (above 99.5%).
Because staking yield is directly linked to performance, even today Ethereum is offering a higher yield to pros than to home stakers: Someone that’s online 96.5% of the time receives 94.7% of the rewards someone with 99.5% uptime gets. To evaluate an issuance curve proposal’s impact on home stakers, it is key to examine this yield differential.
Unfortunately, EIP-8363 is moving completely in the wrong direction. At 0% staked and no burn, the tapered curve is equivalent to status quo. For any positive burn, the relative gap is strictly larger than today, and it grows as burn increases with the staking ratio. Some concrete values (using 96.5% uptime for home and 99.5% uptime for pro):
- at today’s staking ratio (35%), the representative home staker only gets 87.1% of the yield of the representative pro (down from 94.7% today)
- if staking ratio rises to 40%, this drops further to 81.1%
- at 45% staked, the home staker’s yield is only 62% of the pro’s
If one of our goals is to reduce risk of capture and preserve decentralization, we should be extremely wary of a proposal whose mechanical effect is to ramp up yield discrimination between home stakers and professional node operators. This selection effect needs to be treated as a first-order cost of EIP-8363, not an afterthought.
Agree completely. I made the same point here.
The current issuance curve just might accidentally be right in the Goldilocks zone where it serves those who stake their own capital (i.e. home, solo and independent operators) AND those that rely on delegated stake (Coinbase, Kraken, ETF’s, Lido, etc.) reasonably well.
Is it perfect? Maybe not. But it has delivered and continues to deliver Ethereum’s distinct competitive advantage - our diverse validator set. That is the thing that should be protected at all costs. Because there will come a time when it really matters. And quite possibly none of us will be here for it when it does.
Thank you for taking the time to share your concerns. I will mainly address your questions regarding uncertainty in monetary policy since the other topics have been discussed elsewhere already. Ethereum has changed its monetary policy several times directly and indirectly.
To my knowledge precise, 5 times directly:
• Oct. 2017 - EIP-649: Block Reward Reduction from 5 to 3 ETH/ block for PoW
• Feb. 2019 - EIP-1234: Block Reward Adjustment from 3 to 2 ETH/block for PoW
• Dec. 2020 - EIP-2982: Proof-of-Stake launched and running alongside PoW
• Aug. 2021 - EIP-1559: Fees are burnt instead of collected by block producer
• Sep. 2022 - EIP-3675: PoS Merge ; suppressing block rewards for miners by removing PoW
and 2 times indirectly:
• Mar. 2024 - EIP-4844: Danksharding introducing blobs
• Dec. 2026 - EIP-7918: Blob repricing
Our proposal is aligned with the research regarding Minimum Viable Issuance (MVI) that is to be communicated as the ossification of Ethereum Monetary Policy: a max issuance 0.5% for good. We don’t need more, we can get enough and optimal security with this budget.
This used to be true yet we are trending up and the trend matters and the supply compound. Dilution is paid by everyholder and our excess in ETH printing spills over multiple negative externalities notably the fact that staking has no a priori equilibrium under the current curve.
Under most if not all of the usage scenario of Ethereum, the supply growth will be lower than that because of the burn mechanisms (1559 and blobs) thus the communication to holders and potential holders will be much simpler and credibly competitive: your max dilution is 0.5% per year. Furthermore, LEAN Ethereum will bring a redesign of the role of the validators and of our security budget. The issuance commitment made in our proposal has a transition periode of 18 to 24months and the commitment can continue under LEAN (which is a few years away anyway).
Thanks for those remarks. We indeed consider that every staking derivative has a rehypothecation advantage versus raw staking which is amplified by the absence of a priori equilibrium in the current regime.
Improving validator composition is not the primary benefit of our proposal, it bounds quantity while composition needs composition tools such as MEV-Burn (a natural addition, hopefully for I*) and correlation penalties (EIP-7716 proposed for H* too).
You’re right, and I withdraw the claim. Mea culpa. The reasoning error was mine, I went from “consolidation reduces validator count” to “consolidation reduces per-ETH costs for solo stakers” without noticing that the staker at the 32-ETH floor (the one the cost discussion is actually about) has by definition nothing to consolidate. Your 2048-ETH point is the clean way to say the rest: whatever cost effects 7251 has scale with what you can merge, so they favour size. @vshvsh made the same correction elsewhere in the thread and he was right too.
So the direct answer to your opening question is: it isn’t relevant, and I shouldn’t have brought it in like this. One bound on the damage nevertheless, for the record: this was my argument in the thread, not the proposal’s. The EIP’s text doesn’t mention 7251 and nothing in it rests on the claim.
I still have your other posts on my to-do, notably the Motivation edit you asked for at #216.
I think anyone relying on “AI slop detectors” should give this article a careful read:
Thank you for your attention to this matter
Accepted, thanks for suggesting this precision. You’re right that these are two different claims, and our materials have let the first borrow the confidence of the second.
What we argue is that the current curve carries dynamics that push solo stakers out, namely the dilution rising with the ratio, income tax charged on the nominal amount, and no equilibrium to stop either. The tapering bounds those, and it adds no burden that lands harder on a small operator, since the deduction is proportional to each validator’s own rewards, a correct attester never nets negative, and execution-layer income is untouched.
What we don’t establish is that the resulting lower yield preserves or improves the solo-staker share in the validator distribution. That turns on reservation-yield distributions nobody has measured, on which the research is genuinely split, and we shouldn’t be presenting the favourable branch as the defacto expected outcome.
Additionally, we’re working on a solo staker dedicated section / supportive document. Expect adjustments in the EIP text (cc @pintail)
Happy staking to you ![]()