Every single POW coin pays miners this way. 1559 is trying to take this away because recently people have figured out how to âgameâ the system with high frequency transactions (they call it yield farming) and want to remove something that has been in place since day one so they can make high frequency transactions more profitable.
Sound familiar, yes you guessed it, this is the wallstreet crowd and they want to manipulate the system here just like they do on wallstreet with millions of transactions a second, but here they refuse to pay for the increase in transactions that they are perpetuating for THEMSELVES, even though the cost of doing it on Ethereum is far less when compare harware costs.They donât need huge server farms that are as close as possible to the exchangeâŚetc
In the end it will be their greed that brings them to the same point they pushed the miners to with 1057. If they had only let 1057 be implemented based soley on its technical implementation, without them threatening a community split, we would be silent now. Now 1559 will meet the same fate and will not be implemented due to a community split and quite possibly a chain split.
What the waiter analogy above illustrates is that people are offended, they feel used.
Small guys invested money in GPUs and whales burn fees to become even richer, because they know the token price will go higher.
This is in fact again not so true. A GPU miner buys a GPU to hope they make profit, so they mine on whatever chain is more profitable for them to mine on. If they were to actually believe the token price will go higher, why not just buy the token itself?
The GPU miners hope that the fees raise, or the price, or more networks are out there, so they can make profit. Already 3 pools have more than 55% of the networkâs hashrate, and overall the top 15 mining pools control more than 90% of the networkâs hashrate. In decentralization terms, Ethereum network is already pretty central.
Mining is mostly done by the people from that one country. An average Joe doesnât host a full node and mine, instead, uses pools and mines whatever is profitable to mine. I believe community is already complaining about the high transaction fees. So here, who do we call as a community? Miners? Gas spenders? Both of them or none? Because clearly the gas spenders are not happy with it, developers are not happy with it (thatâs why they develop L2 solutions), what we are left with is only miners.
And that brings the question, should we make people pay unacceptable (literally $5 for ETH transactions and over $20 for De-Fi transactions) prices or accept some miners leaving the network due to profitability and make the users happy?
The difference with Ethereum is that Ethereum doesnât have a fixed cap. They have to have a way to encourage miners to mine the coin.
1559 is trying to take this away because recently people have fugured out how to âgameâ the system with high frequency transactions (they call it yield farming) and want to remove something that has been in place since day one so they can make high frequency transactions more profitable.
Believe it or not, but Ethereum wasnât designed to make miners rich, but designed to allow people build decentralized apps on top of it. If DeFis are working in a decentralized way, and some people are making money out of it, whatâs wrong with it? I personally have never tried yield farming or whatever, but it is the transition of the finance. Before it was done on Wall Street behind closed doors, now it is being done publicly. At least people get to see whatâs going on and donât have to rely on third parties.
From an honest minerâs perspective, 1057 only wanted an algo switch to make the ASICs obsolete. If a person invested on a GPU, they could have just switched a miner and thereâd be no problem. Who were against the 1057? The people who own asics and are making waaaay more profit than the average Joe. They didnât want 1057, not the actual community members, ETH users or the actual personal miners. I myself have wanted ProgPow implemented on ETH when I was mining, but not the ASIC miners.
But regardless 1057 WAS approved by the developers after a lengthly and expensive audit. It only failed at implementation because the Defi community stormed into the call, insulted devs and miners, and claimed it would cause a community split. The miners have taken a play out of their playbook and will do the same, but be more respectful to the developers.
1057 fail has nothing to do with DeFi community. From their perspective, nothing would be changed, but from the ASIC ownersâ perspective, their expensive metal thingy boxes would be obsolete. Thatâs why it was rejected. Not because of DeFi people because DeFi people have no power or whatsoever. Thatâs the good thing about blockchain, whoever holds the hashpower, has the saying in the networkâs future. DeFi people could reject as much as they want, if miners wanted, they would have to either fork away (which would be bad for them as well) or keep using ETH.
ASIC miners pushed that 1057 shouldnât be implemented. Not DeFi.
Yes, Iâm aware (good to mention for clarification I guess).
This is humor right? EIP-1559 (if ever implemented, â-smoothed or not) is arguably the most complex change since genesis. New transaction struct, variable block size, overhauling block validation, replacing a simple auction with a multi-layered one that not only changes transaction fees but (as it currently stands) also changes the entire monetary policy (though no one knows exactly to what degree) while simultaneously flipping off the people that secure the network.
Not to mention the resulting risky changes in clients, inter-compatibility, bugs and testnet time needed for implementing and validating all of the above. Oh and of course the UX changes.
I mean, the goal is obviously not simplicity here. besides, the â-smoothed mechanism does not seem overly complex. The paper already implies a nice structure. Block validation could be done efficiently by maintaining a sliding window over the âgas_targetâ and âbase_feeâ fields of the last â blocks (better a couple more than â to prevent long validation in case of uncles/forks). The âpaid-forward base feeâ calculation has equal weights on all blocks so it could be implemented using a simple moving average.
And this minor benefit of imaginary âcontrolâ is worth destabilizing the whole monetary policy for?
Nah, the miners are being paid according to the functional code that is out there today. Proponents of EIP-1559 should be arguing why they propose to screw them over, not the other way around. Again, itâs an Ethereum Improvement Proposal is it not? A growing group of people seem to think that basefee burning is not improving anything.
Simple moving average looks feasible. Simply burn all the transaction fees paid, and put block reward (2 ETH) + simple moving average of burnt fees in last 200 blocks as the extra reward. This would be easier to implement IMO.
He was not arguing for a moving average, but rather explaining how silly the whole premise is in the next sentence âAnd this minor benefit of imaginary âcontrolâ is worth destabilizing the whole monetary policy for?â
The mining community fully umderstands why 1559 is being proposed. The flash traders want to be able to make extremely fast transactions in a very short period of time without increasing gas prices because they will be smoothed. What 1559 proponents fail to realize in game theory if there is a weakness in the system the market will quickly compensate.
In realm terms if doing thousands of TPS for a few seconds becomes even more profitable post 1559 without increasing gas prices over a smoothed period, then everyone will be doing it and you will still end up with higher gas prices anyway. Because of this EIP 1559 will have a short initial lifespan of being useful and only serve one purpose, to screw over the mining community by burning their rewards. The market will adjust and there will be a bunch of wallstreet flash traders keeping gas prices high indefinitely.
This is like saying âlets not build more roads because when there are more roads, people will buy more cars, so thereâll still be more trafficâ.
Let more people use the decentralized network for whatever purpose they are using, whether call it flash traders or something else. Let people pay high gas prices when there are 30-50tps instead of 17 tps
Looks like it is time to finally work with the miners. This will now not be approved by miners with Ethermine (23% of hash) now against 1559. The rest will now follow.
Do you have any material evidence for this assumption? What will happen under EIP-1559 at times when the number of users trying to send a transaction ASAP greatly exceeds the available block capacity? Wonât they have to compete by increasing their miner tips until the point that demand drops to match the existing block capacity? Exactly as is the case today, and needing exactly the same fee estimation algorithms that are in use today in order to give the user a chance for their transaction to be mined during a period of congestion, since there is no protocol mechanism in place to prevent the miner tip from going up to 100%, 1000% of the base fee whenever too many users are in a rush at any point.
I agree, though, that by the time the period of congestion recedes the base fee will have caught up to some extent, and from that point on it will begin to drop slowly, creating an artificial floor to transaction prices â In other words, the base fee might be effective at reducing the volatility of gas prices (though the gas estimation problem for clients to solve is not fundamentally changed in any way), but only at the cost of artificially increasing gas prices once the congestion period is over (!).
Why is a change meant to reduce gas price volatility at the cost of increasing transaction prices being shoved into an EIP meant to reduce transaction prices for everybody? Isnât that a form of riding too?
Some of you may not realize but Hudson will be leaving as the facilitator of the All Core Devs meeting to pursue other interests in Ethereum. This is an intentional move to push 1559 through ASAP regargless if it will create a community split in what is supposed to be an unbiased facilitator position. This is being given to TimBeiko who is being paid by the Defi community for EIP-1559.
I have created a new topic here showing proof Tim is biased and should not be a facilitator. Please go to this topic and voice any conerns.
Thanks. Parameters are usually also declared separately in the text, like MUIR_GLACIER_FORK_BLKNUM in EIP-2384. Itâs unusual that this EIPâs specification is code.
