What do you think are the barriers to create a similar entity for the Ethereum space? I see more of the apathy come from the fact that any mechanism that’s implemented or suggested above would have an accountability that extends beyond capital interests.
From my point of view, there is a huge conflation in this discussion (and the meta) about what is rational from a technical perspective and what is rational as defined by economic game theory. It is technically sound to implement ProgPow (no matter how many iterations it takes, what vulnerabilities are uncovered from the current implementation etc. to fulfill the original security guarantees in the yellow paper, the core devs seem to agree with me), but in this current impasse, economically infeasible to some of the largest shareholders in the space who fund client teams and operate Dapps.
The closer we get to 2.0 the less there is an incentive to actually resolve the issues that caused this contentious debate in the first place. And those that benefit the most from obfuscating how the process actually works will continue to force poor technical decisions onto smaller shareholders.
Ruling by committee by those who do not have enough context to actually make educated decisions is worrisome, but I argue that outcome would be less likely if it was clear who was speaking to what types of changes to the protocol as purely social reputation and technical credibility matters more than we’d like to admit, especially since this discussion has its roots in trying to engineer our way out of this political problem.