This is like saying “lets not build more roads because when there are more roads, people will buy more cars, so there’ll still be more traffic”.
Let more people use the decentralized network for whatever purpose they are using, whether call it flash traders or something else. Let people pay high gas prices when there are 30-50tps instead of 17 tps
Looks like it is time to finally work with the miners. This will now not be approved by miners with Ethermine (23% of hash) now against 1559. The rest will now follow.
EIP-1559 is now DOA!
You are still my favorite Piper 
Do you have any material evidence for this assumption? What will happen under EIP-1559 at times when the number of users trying to send a transaction ASAP greatly exceeds the available block capacity? Won’t they have to compete by increasing their miner tips until the point that demand drops to match the existing block capacity? Exactly as is the case today, and needing exactly the same fee estimation algorithms that are in use today in order to give the user a chance for their transaction to be mined during a period of congestion, since there is no protocol mechanism in place to prevent the miner tip from going up to 100%, 1000% of the base fee whenever too many users are in a rush at any point.
I agree, though, that by the time the period of congestion recedes the base fee will have caught up to some extent, and from that point on it will begin to drop slowly, creating an artificial floor to transaction prices – In other words, the base fee might be effective at reducing the volatility of gas prices (though the gas estimation problem for clients to solve is not fundamentally changed in any way), but only at the cost of artificially increasing gas prices once the congestion period is over (!).
Why is a change meant to reduce gas price volatility at the cost of increasing transaction prices being shoved into an EIP meant to reduce transaction prices for everybody? Isn’t that a form of riding too?
I believe the current specification is missing an initial base fee parameter.
There is an open pull request to fix this at 1559: Changes starting base fee to 1 nanoeth and floors base fee at 0. by MicahZoltu · Pull Request #3204 · ethereum/EIPs · GitHub
Some of you may not realize but Hudson will be leaving as the facilitator of the All Core Devs meeting to pursue other interests in Ethereum. This is an intentional move to push 1559 through ASAP regargless if it will create a community split in what is supposed to be an unbiased facilitator position. This is being given to TimBeiko who is being paid by the Defi community for EIP-1559.
I have created a new topic here showing proof Tim is biased and should not be a facilitator. Please go to this topic and voice any conerns.
Thanks. Parameters are usually also declared separately in the text, like MUIR_GLACIER_FORK_BLKNUM in EIP-2384. It’s unusual that this EIP’s specification is code.
This EIP originally was written like others, but I found that using English to try to sufficiently specify this proved to be way too hard. By the time it was sufficiently specified, I had essentially developed a new DSL that people had to learn. It was much easier to understand by just writing it using a sufficiently specific language that many people already are familiar with and is well documented and can be directly tested.
With 1559 being implemented would it be possible to have the block reward increased back to 3 per block to compromise the fee’s being burnt? Miners have played a huge part in ethereum yet they’re being punished. Burning the fee’s is a positive for traders ect but I think increasing the block reward would be a win win for miners and holders of ethereum. Just my opinion on the matter.
A separate issue with EIP-1559 is that it does not seem to be tested/simulated/analyzed under realistic network conditions.
So we do not know exactly how the formula will behave. We only have a theoretical hypothesis scarcely supported by evidence.
What we need is more testing and analysis comparing different options
IMHO is it a very meaningful thing to do. In particular, it is interesting how tweaking different constants in the formulas can affect results…
An interesting possibility is to start with 1% of blocks using the new system, and then add one 1% say each week, while the rest using the old system. In this way, the experience can be slowly gained …
We decided against that because it was hard to estimate how long the transition should be. Instead, we’re always going to allow legacy transactions, and just have clients interpret them as FEE CAP = GAS PRICE and TIP = GAS PRICE - BASE FEE. This means projects/wallets/etc, don’t have to update if they don’t want to, but their transactions will be less gas-efficient.
Ethermine - 22.7%
Hiveon - 4.4%
2Miners - 3.5%
Flexpool - 0.5%
Ethashpool - 0.4%
WooolPooly - 0.3%
Cruxpool - 0.5%
CrazyPool - 0.4%
Total Network Miners Against 1559 = 32.7%
And yet here we are trying to stop the newest community arrival (Defi) from literally taking over Ethereum by destroying miners and putting their own people in charge of ACD meetings. We need more peoples stories like this, they break my heart.
When is enough money enough for you guys in Defi? I have plenty and have worked hard to get where I am at, but I still look out for the little guys though because I can relate. Crypto has the potential to change society and put small people back in control of their own finances. This was one of my main drivers for joining the crypto community. Just because you have the money and power does not mean you should use it to step on the people without it to gain more.
We have moved so far away from the founding principals of why Ethereum was started in the first place.
Link below to 1559-mining discord comment. Sadly this guy posted his comment and nobody responded.
I’m glad to see some work attempting to verify the economic assumptions behind this proposal. Unfortunately I haven’t found anything among the simulation notebooks linked there that would be able to answer the question I’ve been asking to myself: Will the imposition of a base fee lead to higher gas prices on the average (compared to the massively simpler alternative of modestly increasing the block gas limit)?
All the simulation work I’ve come across so far focuses on comparing the performance of legacy vs. EIP-1559-aware transaction users in a post-EIP-1559 world, but that doesn’t answer the question of whether the introduction of a base fee in itself is doing any favor to us transaction users on the average, it only tells us that adopting the canonical post-EIP-1559 fee estimation strategy has certain advantages over continuing to send legacy transactions in an EIP-1559 world (which isn’t surprising since legacy users are still required to pay the base fee even though without EIP-1559 they would have been able to bid below it). Some objective comparison between this proposal and the feasible alternatives seems badly needed (Feel free to provide a link if some work has already been done in that area, I’m very interested to see the results).
EIP-1559 put simply:
1559 was made to benefit sophisticated computer driven trading systems designed to take advantage of BASEFEE vs Farmed Coins yields that can run thousands of transactions in a single block. This is Wallstreet Flash Traders wanting to change Ethereum so they can do thousands of transactions in a block and pass the majority of the costs onto others while taking the rightful profits away from the miners.
1559 will NOT meaningfully reduce gas prices for end users. This is not a goal of EIP-1559. Gas price reduction comes with either reduced demand for block space (rollups) or increased block space (sharding). EIP-1559 is expected to leave users with approximately the same gas price on average, with maybe a small decrease due to gas pricing efficiency improvements enabled by EIP-1559 (so people no longer over-estimate gas prices).
What he is trying to say is 1559 will only reduce fees for yield farmers that are dumping thousands of transactions into a block and then not pay the extra fees to miners. Additionally if the yield farmers do this for an extended period the fees WILL go up for everyone and then slowly come back down since it is an average over time.
What is also not being told is this change will cause a huge explosion in yield farming and WILL result in higher BASEFEEs as the average goes up and will then establish a new floor and ceiling based solely on farming profitability. Of course the counter argument is there is no way to predict the impact. Bottom line is if something becomes extremely profitable, those who have the resources (systems than can do thousands of transactions per block) will take full advantage of it.
Thank you for stating that clearly, there is plenty of confusion floating around the internet in this regard. May I ask what the practical benefit of this will be to the end user? (to the majority of us unlucky enough to have arrived too late to the party to have had the chance to amass a large quantity of ether that would appreciate significantly from its deflationary effect 
)
I understand that it will reduce the variance of gas prices (which admittedly has been rather annoying to me during the last few months), but if that comes at the cost of increasing average gas prices in the long run I think I personally prefer to keep the variance, as any frequent enough transaction user probably would, because variance tends to cancel out over time (as in the Law of large numbers), while any increase in the average gas prices would add up over time.
How can imposing a minimum gas price ever lead to a reduction in prices in a competitive market? Isn’t it worth considering the possibility that it might have an effect opposite to the intended, as one would intuitively expect from the imposition of a minimum price? Just so we can avoid unpleasant surprises down the road.
