ReceiptOS — verifiable execution receipts for agent

ReceiptOS — verifiable execution receipts for agent tool calls

Summary

As autonomous agents and tool-calling systems become more common, we are missing a fundamental primitive: verifiable execution receipts.

Today, when an agent calls a tool (API, plugin, contract, off-chain service), there is no standardized way to prove:

  • what was executed

  • with which inputs

  • what output was returned

  • whether the result was tampered with

ReceiptOS is a minimal framework for producing and verifying execution receipts — cryptographically signed records of tool calls that can be validated off-chain or on-chain.


Problem

Agent systems (LLMs, copilots, autonomous workflows) rely heavily on tool execution:

  • API calls

  • contract interactions

  • external services

  • local scripts

However, the current model is trust-based, not verifiable.

This creates multiple issues:

  1. No auditability
    You cannot reliably reconstruct what an agent actually did.

  2. No integrity guarantees
    Outputs can be modified without detection.

  3. No composability
    Tool results cannot be safely reused or verified by other systems.

  4. No standard interface
    Each system logs execution differently (or not at all).


Core idea

ReceiptOS introduces a simple primitive:

Every tool call produces a signed receipt.

A receipt includes:

  • tool identifier

  • input payload (hashed or structured)

  • output payload (hashed or structured)

  • timestamp

  • execution context (optional)

  • signature

Example (simplified):

{
  "tool": "price_oracle.getETHUSD",
  "input_hash": "0xabc...",
  "output_hash": "0xdef...",
  "timestamp": 1710000000,
  "signature": "0x..."
}

The receipt can then be:

  • verified locally

  • passed between agents

  • anchored on-chain (optional)

  • used as proof in higher-level workflows


Why this matters

This is not just logging — it is a trust layer for agent execution.

It enables:

  • deterministic replay (with matching inputs/outputs)

  • tamper detection

  • cross-agent verification

  • audit trails for autonomous systems

  • composable tool outputs

In other words, it turns tool calls into verifiable artifacts.


Relation to Ethereum / EVM

There are several natural integration points:

  1. ERC-style verifier interfaces
    Contracts can verify receipts (e.g. isValidReceipt(...)).

  2. Account abstraction / smart wallets
    Receipts can be used as execution proofs for agent-driven wallets.

  3. Off-chain → on-chain bridging
    Receipts provide a minimal proof layer for external computation.

  4. Standardization potential (ERC/EIP)
    A unified receipt schema + verification interface could become a shared primitive.


Design principles

  • Minimal — small schema, no heavy dependencies

  • Deterministic — reproducible hashing/signing

  • Composable — receipts can be chained

  • Transport-agnostic — works with any agent/tool system

  • Verification-first — verification is a core primitive, not an afterthought


Current status

  • MVP implemented (CLI + minimal API)

  • Basic flows: sign, verify, verify-chain

  • Demonstrations:

    • tampering detection

    • replay detection

    • receipt chaining

Next step:
→ define a stable schema and explore standardization path


Open questions

  • Should receipt verification be standardized as an ERC interface?

  • What is the minimal schema that still allows composability?

  • How should receipts be anchored (if at all) on-chain?

  • Do we need domain separation for different tool classes?

  • How does this interact with existing signature standards (EIP-1271, ERC-7913)?


Discussion

Looking for feedback on:

  • whether this primitive is useful at the protocol / ecosystem level

  • how it should integrate with EVM standards

  • whether it makes sense to move toward an ERC/EIP

If relevant, I can share the MVP repo and examples.

2 Likes

### Current status

A working implementation is available, including:

- CLI (sign / verify / verify-chain)

- minimal API

- tamper and replay demonstrations

The current focus is on refining the receipt schema and exploring standardization.

Quick update:

We now have:

- a canonical Match Integrity demo (valid / tamper / continuity fail),

- a PQ fixture path (vector_001) + historical provenance payload (vector_raw),

- a minimal anchoring harness (ReceiptAnchor / GameEventAnchor).

Would love guidance on the highest-value next step:

1. harden off-chain verifier semantics

2. define a minimal anchoring pattern (checkpoint vs periodic root)

3. focus on AA / L2 integration

4. prioritize a concrete gaming-integrity pilot

If you had to pick one for fastest real-world validation — what would it be?

1 Like

Quick status update.

ReceiptOS has evolved quite a bit since the original post.

The focus is no longer individual signed tool-call receipts. The current direction is portable receipt artifacts built around exported evidence and recomputable verification state.

Current components:

  • receipt_root

  • Evidence Capsule

  • Provenance Summary

  • replay references

  • anchor references

  • verifier-facing receipt state

  • producer-neutral proof boundary

A working developer-preview viewer is available:

Crystal Receipt
https://github.com/pipavlo82/crystal-receipt

The design goal is increasingly:

producer evidence
→ receipt artifact
→ receipt_root
→ verifier-facing receipt surface

rather than:

tool call
→ signature
→ standalone receipt

I’m also experimenting with Chronicle as a higher-level composition/timeline layer for connecting multiple receipt artifacts into a coherent history:

https://github.com/pipavlo82/Chronicle

Still interested in feedback, especially around portability, recomputability, and how receipt artifacts should compose with adjacent layers rather than absorb them.

ReceiptOS v0.8 — Recomputable Evidence and Counterfactual Verifier Conformance

I haven’t posted the earlier v0.6 release here, so a short context first.

ReceiptOS is an attempt to define a portable receipt for a single agent action whose integrity can be recomputed without trusting the producer. The basic discipline is: gates, not scores; don’t trust, recompute.

v0.6 established the Evidence Capsule model, deterministic receipt-root derivation, threat boundaries, and cross-specification composition.

v0.8 is now the current frozen version and adds an executable verifier-of-verifier layer:

  • an exact 10-member Deterministic Counterfactual Neighborhood: 8 semantic-neighbor members, 1 boundary rejection, and 1 composite relation;
  • Counterfactual Conformance v0 with authenticated expected-result binding and production execution;
  • Counterfactual Traversal Stability v1 over 12 authenticated schedules;
  • 120/120 stable scheduled evaluations, including 110 non-canonical comparisons;
  • 0 history-sensitive, 0 unresolved;
  • 10/10 first-position profile coverage;
  • a separate fresh-worker canonical repeat with 10/10 exact member-record agreement, reported outside the frozen 120 total.

The claim is deliberately bounded. This does not establish universal verifier correctness, source truth, legal admissibility, or downstream policy correctness. It establishes reproducible agreement for the exact authenticated neighborhood and schedule profile.

Paper / DOI:

Repository / reproducibility artifacts:

Interested in feedback particularly on the verifier-conformance boundary, the separation of unresolved execution from semantic nonconformance, and the authenticated traversal-profile model.