Hey guys, I appreciate the feedback.
The way I saw it there were two groups of people that could potentially front-run, everyone and miners. The everyone group could front-run using a very simple bot that submits transactions while miners would have a more difficult time due to the fact that they would need to find the block in question in order to re-order the transactions in a favorable way. My thinking was stopping the larger group would at least be a step in the right direction and then the odds of front-running become a function of the ratio of miners participating in front-running.
That logic is a bit naive though, especially as mining fees decrease with EIP-1559 miners will be more incentivized than ever to extract value wherever possible.
I still think a median gas price operator would be useful from a contract programming perspective but I don’t know if it’s different enough from the basefee operator to justify adding it. I also assumed that there would be inclusion fee competition after EIP-1559 but that would only happen if the economics don’t work as expected - which seems unlikely to me now after thinking about it more.
So, I agree this change is probably unnecessary. Also, thanks @MicahZoltu for suggesting a commit reveal system for fraud proofs. Such a system is still vulnerable to front-running but could probably be tweaked to work well.
I’m not sure what to do with this EIP, I can edit it to be withdrawn or the PR can simply be closed. I’m in favor of finishing the changes and marking it withdrawn so the discussion is preserved.