Ethereum Fund Recovery Protocol (EFRP)

While fully objective systems are the ideal, the reality is that some parts of decentralised governance just can’t operate that way yet. Ethereum itself is a good example: core development decisions and Ethereum Foundation stewardship ultimately rely on a subjective, socially coordinated, “council-like” process. Decisions are shaped by discussion, expert opinion and rough consensus rather than a strict algorithm or purely on-chain mechanism. So introducing a structured council in this protocol wouldn’t be adding something unusual or foreign to the ecosystem, it would simply formalise a pattern that already exists.

It seems that what’s being proposed is a transparent, criteria-driven council intended to address a long-standing issue within the Ethereum network. If we accept that this problem exists—and if we genuinely care about the network’s long-term resilience, competitiveness, and ability to evolve—then it’s something that ultimately needs to be resolved. In an ultra-competitive environment, leaving structural weaknesses unaddressed isn’t a neutral choice; it’s a risk to the network’s future. This proposal offers a structured way to confront that problem rather than continuing to ignore it.

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I was also affected by the Parity bug and would love to see this play out as I think that this is finally a proposal that doesn’t need hard forks nor does it put much strain on ETH and the ETH network to proceed and could also be used for future issues…

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We at ICONOMI, one of the larger wallets affected by the Parity multisig freeze, want to share our perspective on this topic.

ICONOMI was launched through an ICO on Ethereum, and our history is closely connected to the Ethereum network. One thing we have always appreciated about Ethereum is its willingness to openly discuss complex edge cases, especially when the outcomes aren’t straightforward or comfortable.

The Parity multisig freeze was not caused by user intent or risk-taking; it was a failure that permanently locked funds belonging to Ethereum early adopters, with no way to recover them. Overlooking that distinction risks treating all losses equally, even when the causes are clearly different.

From ICONOMI’s viewpoint, the proposal from the Locked ETH community is a thoughtful, narrowly focused effort to address an issue that other protocols have already solved, whilst still respecting Ethereum’s principles of immutability, governance, and social consensus. It’s not about setting a broad precedent, but rather about tackling a very specific issue that the community has not yet resolved.

As a crypto assets investment platform, we support this and potential new initiatives/proposals to put in place an “assets recovery protocol” in favour of rightful owners. Any funds recovered from the affected ICONOMI wallet through the EFRP (this or future ones) will be returned to our users and Ethereum early adopters.

We appreciate the work behind this proposal and support ongoing, honest discussions regarding its trade-offs and long-term implications for Ethereum.

Our statement can also be found on our blog.

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I’ve also posted the proposal to the main Ethereum reddit: Link

I wanted to highlight a post by user Kukuman88 which I thought shares an intresting perspective.

​I completely respect the hardline stance on immutability—it’s the only reason Ethereum has value. If we start “refunding” every bad trade or lost private key, the protocol is dead.

​However, I think we’re conflating user error with a structural protocol debt. There is a middle ground between “Code is Law” and “Total Chaos,” and it’s called maintenance.

If I send 100 ETH to the wrong address, that’s on me. The “Code” worked exactly as intended. But the Parity situation isn’t a bad trade; it’s a structural weld. Imagine a public storage unit where a manufacturer’s defect accidentally welds the main gate shut from the inside. The owners have the keys, the deeds are verified, but the physics of the building now prevents the intended use.

​Fixing that gate isn’t a “bailout”—it’s structural maintenance. By refusing to fix a known, non-contentious bug that has permanently bricked a significant portion of the supply, we aren’t defending the “Law”; we are defending a “Glitched Gate.”

We often hold Bitcoin up as the gold standard of “Code is Law,” but in 2010, the community collectively decided that a bug (the Value Overflow Incident) was a threat to the system’s integrity. They didn’t say, “Well, the code allowed 184 billion BTC to be created, so that’s the law now.” They performed a hard fork to fix the state.

​If the “World Computer” cannot handle an obvious, unintended state-lock without the whole community having a panic attack, then the system is brittle not secure.

Most of us hate the DAO recovery because it rewrote history (a rollback). The new proposals aren’t asking to change what happened. They are asking for a new state transition to address funds that are currently in a “Dead State.”

​If we want Ethereum to be the foundation of global finance, it has to be resilient. A system that allows billions to be permanently deleted due to a single library suicide—and then refuses to ever address it—isn’t a “Law-based” system; it’s a “Zero-Fault-Tolerance” system that will eventually alienate every rational actor.

I think the reality we all need to acknowledge is that if the Parity Lock or any other similar issues (in the past, present or future) affects enough users it is incredibly likely some sort of intervention will take place again just like we did in the past with the DAO hack. Which means we’ve effectively created a form of two tier justice where the “code is law” rules only apply if it concerns a small affected minority.

I think this is a highly undesirable outcome that is fundamentally morally unjust. In order to prevent this it makes sense to me that in situations where proof of ownership can still be demonstrated by use of the private key that we have a recovery mechanism so users can regain access to lost funds. When this recovery mechanism applies to all users equally it can help prevent the current two tier justice that is the reality today.

I wish we could do the same for the issue of lost private keys and/or stolen funds. But clearly those are much harder to tackle since from a blockchain perspective ownership can then not be demonstrated anymore or has transferred to the hacker. Which makes those scenarios fundamentally incomparable to funds that are simply inaccessible.

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Saw this topic on Reddit pass by: Reddit - The heart of the internet

Even today so many funds getting lost, to me this showcases that having some sort of recovery mechanism for compromised funds seems critical for increased resilience and improved usability of the network.

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hey im trying to recover 29eth in a contract i own / i have all owner keys.. let me know if its possible to submit a claim or something :slight_smile: would help my life out lol

It sounds like your case might qualify for the EFRP, however unfortunately at this time there seems to be no community support for the EFRP and it is so far only a proposal.

I’m sorry for your loss.

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would be defintely life changing i own all the keys, just bad contract smh

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Automation is difficult. But if it’s not impossible it might be the only path forward for this or similar proposals – the objections to any sort of council are just too strong. And I agree that we need a mechanism for recovering ETH that is lost through no fault if its owner. I don’t know much about how collateralization works, but it seems there must be some mechanism by which the lender has some control over or knowledge of the keys to the collateral.

I believe I have a way to reduce the manual/human oversight methods such as committees or councils using this method. Feedback welcome. @gcolvin @Cova @iconomi_official @Psylar

I really think reducing manual/human oversight will determine what a successful EIP would look like. Are you planning on publishing this on your own or were you looking to get others involved too?

How about this approach?

  1. Start a new DAO, install yourselves as chairpeople
  2. Hear proposals of who should receive tokens, vote and send out tokens, with face value of 1.0 ETH each time
  3. Accept donations to your treasury
  4. Capitalize (using your own tokens, not "treasury tokens”) a swap pool to convert to WETH.

And then after you have done this part (nobody is stopping you), go ahead and come back and look here to look for more donations or see whether people who run clients would like to update their client to donate their money to your treasury.

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will give someone 10k in eth if they can help find a way to get this eth out.. theres 29 eth in there.. 0x138C2F1123cF3f82E4596d097c118eAc6684940B i have all they keys .. i wont give any keys out or anything … just a shot in the dark here.. maybe theres a way..

I fully agree with you, the council and the human factor it introduces is the weakest point of the EFRP. When I wrote the proposal I didn’t see any way in which this work could be automated, which is why I settled on a council with as many safeguards as possible. But recent developments have made me reconsider. With the current capabilities of AI perhaps automating the assessment work is no longer impossible and the council could be replaced entirely.

That said I do think we might still need some form of human emergency brake, a way to pause the EFRP as a last resort in case the AI gets things badly wrong. Not a council that judges individual cases, but purely a failsafe.

I’m curious how you would see this working in practice. Do you think an AI-driven assessment could gain enough trust from the community, and what would an acceptable failsafe look like to you?

First of all I want to thank you for the work you’ve put into this, it is clear a great deal of time and energy went into this proposal. From a purely technical perspective, looking solely at resolving the Parity lock, this is the cleanest proposal I have seen so far. Hats off.

I do want to offer one important clarification regarding the EFRP. The recovery mechanism does not rely on voluntary donations. Instead sETH is redeemed through a repurposing of the base fee (EIP-1559) that is currently being burned. Since the compromised ETH is burned up front, no third party is asked to fund the recovery out of their own pocket.

You are right that your approach would not require a hard fork and could be implemented directly, nobody is stopping us there. But personally I see this quite differently. I view this problem as fundamentally a technical problem, and I feel a technical solution is the appropriate answer to it.

Since the Dencun upgrade (EIP-6780) the workings of the SELFDESTRUCT opcode have been permanently changed, ensuring a tragedy like the Parity freeze can never happen again. To me this means the Ethereum community has acknowledged the opcode was problematic and has addressed it. It then follows logically that the enormous damage this opcode has already caused should be repaired as well.

So I would ask you: do you agree the opcode was problematic and that it was right to address it during the Dencun upgrade? And if you do, why would it not be logical to also repair the damage this same opcode has already inflicted on innocent victims?

Three choices — and doing nothing is one of them

It has now been more than eight years since the Parity wallet freeze locked 513,774 ETH belonging to 598 wallets. In that time we have seen EIP-999, years of silence, the EFRP, and most recently the ODLR proposal by @tkwr441. With two concrete, well-specified proposals on the table I think it is worth taking a step back and looking honestly at the full decision space. As I see it there are now exactly three choices in front of the community. Doing nothing is one of them, and it deserves to be examined on its merits just like the other two — because not deciding is also a decision, we just don’t take responsibility for it.

Choice 1: The status quo — we do nothing and leave things as they are

The consequences of this choice are clear. The victims, who did not write a single line of the code that failed them, lose everything. A small affected minority is asked by a large unaffected majority to give up their funds permanently, in the name of immutability. Since this is the default choice it requires no EIP, no code and no effort, which is exactly what makes it so easy to drift into. But if we are going to make this choice, we should at least be honest about the arguments carrying it.

The first is immutability itself. With the greatest respect to those who hold immutability as absolute: that position was tested in 2016. The DAO fork moved 3.6 million ETH, and those who truly considered immutability inviolable had a home in Ethereum Classic. Almost the entire community, myself included, is here on the forked chain. Some will say the DAO was different because it threatened the network’s survival — but that concedes the point. In practice we have always treated immutability as a strong principle that can, in truly exceptional circumstances, be weighed against other values. The question was never whether we weigh it. The question is where we draw the line, and who ends up on the wrong side of it.

The second is a bitter irony that I feel gets far too little attention: the thing that destroyed these wallets is itself the immutability breaker. As was noted in the discussions that eventually led to EIP-6780, SELFDESTRUCT was the only opcode that broke the code immutability invariant — it permanently erased valid, deployed code from the chain. So the “do nothing” position asks us to preserve, in the name of immutability, the damage done by the one opcode that violated immutability. That is not defending a principle. That is defending a wound.

And the community has already acknowledged this. With the Dencun upgrade (EIP-6780, March 2024) the workings of SELFDESTRUCT were permanently changed, precisely because the opcode was recognized as problematic. A tragedy like the Parity freeze can never happen again. But we fixed it only for the future. We recalled the defective part for all future cars, and we tell the people whose cars already crashed that repairs are against our principles.

Even Bitcoin, held up as the gold standard of “code is law”, faced this exact dilemma. In August 2010 an integer overflow created 184 billion BTC out of thin air. Within five hours a patched client was released and the network abandoned the chain containing the exploit. Nobody today calls Bitcoin mutable, and nobody calls that intervention a bailout. When a bug threatens the integrity of the system, fixing the damage is maintenance, not betrayal.

Finally there is the question of scale and of justice. Research by Coinbase’s Conor Grogan (2025) conservatively estimates over 913,000 ETH — roughly $3.4 billion, about 0.76% of all circulating ETH — permanently lost to bugs and irreversible errors, and that excludes lost private keys. This is not one unfortunate incident; it is a structural property of the system as it stands. And let us be honest with ourselves: if 60% of ETH holders had been affected by the Parity freeze, it would have been fixed years ago — the DAO proved exactly that. A principle that binds only small minorities is not a principle. It is two-tier justice.

There is also now a clock on this choice. Verkle trees and state expiry are front-runners for the next upgrade cycle, and the dormant Parity contracts are precisely the kind of state that expiry mechanisms prune. Doing nothing today does not keep the question open for tomorrow. It quietly answers it, permanently, without anyone ever having to take responsibility for the answer.

Doing nothing places the entire cost of a systemic failure on innocent victims. In my eyes it is the most immoral of the three choices, precisely because it disguises itself as not choosing at all.

Choice 2: Develop the EFRP further and bring it online

The EFRP is a small, limited, but flexible governance solution. Its strength is that it is universal: it applies to every case — past, present and future — in which legitimate owners can still cryptographically prove ownership of their funds but have lost access, regardless of the specific technical cause. It requires no hard fork and no state change. Compromised ETH is burned forever, victims receive sETH 1:1, and the sETH is gradually redeemed by repurposing the EIP-1559 base fee that is currently being burned — net inflation of zero, immutability fully intact.

More fundamentally, the EFRP is an acknowledgment that Ethereum is still a young technology in which catastrophic mistakes will inevitably occur, with severe consequences for those affected. A standing, rule-based recovery mechanism does not weaken the network — it strengthens it, by significantly lowering the smart contract risk that today forms a real barrier to adoption for both individuals and institutions.

I will be honest about its weakest point, because others here have rightly pointed at it: the council, and the human factor it introduces. When I wrote the proposal I saw no way to automate the assessment work. Perhaps, with current AI capabilities, that is no longer true — a fully automated assessment with only a human emergency brake as a last resort. I consider this an open question and I welcome ideas on it.

Choice 3: Adopt the ODLR — a unique technical solution

The ODLR is not an ambitious universal recovery mechanism like the EFRP, and it does not try to be. It is an elegant, narrow, purely technical solution: restore the bytecode of a shared library that was destroyed by an unauthorized third party, via a mechanical rule with strict on-chain eligibility criteria, owner consent thresholds, and a public challenge protocol. No ETH moves. No storage changes. No case-by-case politics.

To me, developing the ODLR further is the logical consequence of EIP-6780. The community has already judged the SELFDESTRUCT opcode problematic enough to neutralize it for the future. Restoring the damage this same opcode already inflicted on innocent victims is simply the other half of that repair. For the Parity freeze specifically, it is the cleanest solution I have seen in eight years.

The choice in front of us

So there are three options on the table. Doing nothing places a disproportionate burden on innocent victims and, ironically, preserves the damage done by the very opcode that broke immutability — the most immoral choice, and the only one nobody has to argue for out loud. The EFRP is a limited but flexible governance solution for all cases, past and future, where legitimate ownership can still be proven. The ODLR is a one-time, elegant technical repair for the specific class of damage caused by an opcode the community has since neutralized.

The two proposals are not even mutually exclusive — one could repair the Parity class directly while the other covers everything the first cannot reach. The only outcome I hope we can avoid is choosing neither by silence.

I am truly curious which option people would choose, and why.

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