I’ve been informed that comments outside the “safe space” of this antiquated message forum will not/should not be considered as part of the ACD process debating this EIP for inclusion, as people outside this forum are low-IQ or don’t really hold ETH or whatever, so here are my objections to this proposal distilled from stuff I’ve already said in more relevant/broader and accurately sentiment-measuring public town squares:
Do not rewrite Ethereum’s monetary policy today to pre-empt an unobserved future staking problem, especially when the intervention is likely to require redesign soon and will preferentially damage solo/decentralized stakers while strengthening centralized exchanges.
1. No urgent problem exists today.
Ethereum’s current issuance and staking ratio (~33%) do not create measurable harm. Net dilution is already low (and frequently near-neutral after burns). There is no evidence that current issuance is driving away investors, holders, or builders. More staking can be net-positive: it locks ETH, increases long-term commitment, and strengthens economic security. Advocates must first show why more stake is intrinsically bad and, if bad, at what % it becomes bad (every incremental % above 30?) and, assuming all that, why intervention is required now.
2. The feared end-states are speculative and overstated.
Claims that staking will inevitably hit 50%+ (or approach 100%) rest on weak analogies. Even high-reward, low-friction environments (Terra at peak with 15%+ APR + airdrops + liquidity mining + in-protocol LST + QE macro) did not produce universal staking. Staking still carries real costs and risks (slashing, smart-contract, custody, liquidity fragmentation). Other PoS networks with generous rewards also stop well short of 100%. Act on observed problems, not projected ones that may never materialize.
3. The proposal does not (and cannot) net-reduce intermediation.
Ethereum does not control the full supply of validator rewards. Large centralized players (Coinbase, Kraken, etc.) can and do offer extra incentives outside the protocol—leverage on staked ETH, bundled services, superior MEV capture, TVL competition, etc. Pure protocol-based solutions (Lido) and solo stakers cannot match this. Cutting protocol issuance therefore hits decentralized and solo options harder while leaving CEX-controlled stake relatively resilient. Result: capital migrates from Lido-style trust-minimized staking toward centralized custodians—the opposite of the stated decentralization goal. You cannot reduce both Lido and Coinbase; the proposal selectively weakens the better form of intermediation, while also likely reducing non-intermediated (solo) stakers as well thus possibly net increasing intermediation in general.
4. Timing and process are wrong.
This is a major monetary-policy change. Lean Ethereum and related roadmap items will redefine validator roles, duties, and the full set of parties that need to be compensated. Changing the issuance curve now almost guarantees reopening the entire question shortly afterward. Better to wait until the reward landscape is clearer rather than lock in a curve that may soon be obsolete. Persons with related similar proposals differing in details have been soft-coerced into standing down so that the community can unite behind this one kingmade by justin drake. The proposal is undermotivated relative to its scale and has been advanced in a highly politicized way
5. Public justifications vs. private motivations.
It’s well known in certain circles that at least part of the real motivation behind this post is to reduce the # of validators to make L1 scaling easier. Thus the public framing (dilution, “capture resistance,” soft cap at 50%) does not fully match the real motivations and we are being partially deceived/gaslit through a deliberate psyops process. This also explains why the proponents of the proposal are oddly resistant to clearly articulating any real problem solution statement that does not simply restate the premise that more staking is bad–they can’t do it, as if the proposal were explicitly aimed at reducing # of validators and thus decentralization it would have even less of a chance of passing.
-Gabriel Shapiro, @lex_node, Esq., raw unstaked ETH holder for nearly 100% of net worth, MetaLeX founder/builder