Thanks - this is a very helpful response and it closes most of the gap for me.
I agree that the operator-revenue section is about limiting unbounded expansion and was not intended to and does not predict who exits first. Also accept the stronger reservation-yield argument; I do have quibbles over the profit v. revenue remark (think Corpo!), but that is a fair reason why lower issuance need not automatically harm solos more.
On the flip: We still do not know whether solo operating costs or delegated-staking fees and risks dominate as yields fall, and the cited research does appear to be mixed. MEV smoothing and stacked DeFi yield also remain as potential advantages, but are unrelated to this EIP.
So my view went from “where the bridge at” to “there is a reasonable theoretical bridge, but the impact to validator comp remains uncertain.”
On balance though @jdetychey, please consider a revision to the proposed language which does not frame solo protection as an expected outcome. I would prefer the EIP to distinguish with more clarity between (1) removing status-quo pressures that harm solo stakers and (2) establishing that the taper itself will preserve solo-staker participation. (1) is argued and (2) remains uncertain. This then allows future proposals to build and research towards a more sound, net positive journey for solos.
That’s it from this guy; your response is appreciated. I will not stop staking based on this proposal, and after digging very deeply, wouldn’t even entertain it. The taper may indeed be the better risk than for delegated stake to continue growing without a counter-balance.
Frickin’, like, math, man.