I truly recommend watching that video, is a very insightful vision on ethereum as a whole, but mostly for what type of governance we need to build.
Also, you don’t have to watch it, just listen, like a podcast, but the presentation is like 25 minutes, the remaining is Q/A, which is also interesting.
What are your doubts? That someone cannot trust other in a very specific topic? If you address the problem clearly I can explain how you can solve it under Liquid Democracy.
I am aware of the weaknesses of Delegation, and under my version of Liquid Democracy (called µTopic Democracy) I am implementing counter measures to assert that Delegation is reversible even after approval.
I didnt wanted to enter in details here because I think is out of scope, but I am happy to discuss it if you willing, as it might be important for the design of this EIP.
First of all, we need to address Why liquid democracy?
There are many constraints that cause low vote engagement, such as low understanding of issues, not enough time to take care of decisions, cost associated with voting.
The strongest point is voting complexity, not everyone is aware about everything at everytime. The liquid democracy would solve that by using the influence flow of specializable delegation chains, that builds a trust network.
Delegates with many voting power can more easily reach absolute quorums (50%+1) or even qualified quorums (90%) then many individuals by their own.
What are the weakness of delegation?
The weakness that delegation brings is the reintroduction of trust, as you mentioned, trusting is something we don’t like here in blockchain world.
Centralization of power is another problem that is brought by delegation, we can have too few individuals with all power.
Maybe you can contribute to this list aswell? What are your doubts?
How my version of Liquid Democracy Works?
µTopic Democracy aims to solve the weakness of trust by requiring a veto period before execution.
The Veto Period uses a different delegation topic (veto delegation) and require a very low quorum to a proposal be vetoed. A veto can only be suggested for something that was previously approved, and takes the same duration of the voting period. However, before approval, during the voting period, anyone that delegated can overwrite the vote and undelegate, because it uses the voting end block to read delegation and token balances.
The centralization of power is aimed to be solved by allowing the micro topics to be very specific, so instead of centralizing the influence, it is redistributed through the delegation chains.
There is need of information tooling to visualize how your influence is being used by the delegates.
µTopic Democracy incentives direct voting by externalizing the gas cost to the proponent, signed votes can be included in a merkle tree, which can be counted in a tabulation period, paid by the proponent (or volunteers). Is possible to also operate on a total offchain tabulation, where you specify an proof-of-stake system (or authority with large stake to determine the voting result), which is calculated offchain, and included by this address, and can be contested by anyone simply by paying the gas cost of tabulation, similar to plasma contract security.