The problem is that all of those “additional measures” have a cost to the network. As @mtefagh has shown here and in the main EIP-1559 thread the same safeguards in place meant to prevent miner collusion can be taken advantage of by users in order to manipulate the price, and as I have shown in my recent comment the delayed accounting of the base fee necessarily leads to economic inefficiency, which wouldn’t necessarily be the case if miners didn’t have a perverse incentive to manipulate the base fee as @mtefagh is suggesting in this post.
In addition the “additional measure” of burning the base fee comes at the cost of roughly halving the price that an adversary needs to pay in order to 51%-attack the network, as we have discussed at length in the main EIP-1559 thread. And more importantly, none of these additional measures remove the perverse incentive for miners to simply censor and shut down the EIP-1559 fork, which would also get the base fee out of their way but, unlike the attack described in this post, would be a Nash equilibrium, since defecting miners would have an incentive to join the coalition in order to prevent their block from being orphaned eventually.