@MicahZoltu23m
Democracy, monarchy, and even dictatorships would not be that bad if it was reasonably easy for disenfranchised citizens to “fork” (secede).
I actually agree with that point. I like that disenfranchised users can fork, it gives them power. I do not advocate taking away the forking power from users (that’s impossible) but trying our best to negotiate with disenfranchised users to avoid that happening, because a united community is a stronger one. That’s why I am against the EIP999: doesn’t matter where you stand on it, you have to admit there’s enough dissent to guarantee there will be a fork if it comes to it. And balancing the issues with a split community versus the gains of having web3 foundation and a few other teams recover their ether, I don’t think it’s worth it.
I agree that governance is required and could be used for this. I would like to bring EIP960 in this: the ether cap is something we are discussing. My opinion is that I believe that I believe we might definitely be overpaying for security and, specially when we switch to proof of stake. So here’s my suggestion on how to attempt solve governance, 960 and 999 at the same time:
- When we switch to PoS, we should instead of cutting down the extra issuance, instead give it (maybe less than current) to a contract that will fund public goods.
- The governance of that contract is open to debate, maybe it can be a complex multiple stakeholder vote, or could be some sort of futarchy or another crazy idea.
- The contract would once per year decide on how it could distribute funds the next year, towards all sorts of public goods including:
- Fund open source development
- Fund insurance pools
- Redress and reimburse victims of hacks, bugs and other kinds of loss (this could include things like the Parity Multisig case - and could even apply retroactively to the web3 foundation)
- Burn ether to reduce the cap, if the governance decides it’s the best usage
Of course the really tricky part is of course, how that governance would happen. But I think this would allow to keep many parties happy: it creates a structured format to redress grievances and take actions for damaged parties that doesn’t have a fork, limits the power of governance (it cannot freeze or interfere in other contracts, can only distribute X amounts of ether per year), etc.
My suggestion for a governance model would be to be a simple multisig, but instead of having private keys on the multisig, each “chair” would be a different contract, that would represent stakeholders (so validators could vote on with their stake power, maybe users would have a different sort of contract, etc)