@elliot_olds
what are we more worried about, people from outside the ecosystem attacking Ethereum or mining companies attacking it?
Are Core Scientific and nChain inside or outside the ecosystem?
I think you want to decrease the chance of attack (increase the cost of attack) of any single entity, whether inside or outside the ecosystem.
The best way to get there is sustained competition between as many parties as possible aiming for both cryptographically and thermodynamically provable PoW. “Parties” means anyone from chipmakers to machine/system integrators to hosters/miners/mining companies to mining pools.
Despite my disagreements, Kristy deserves props for engaging with the arguments of ProgPow opponents.
Kristy is your attack vector, from within.
They created the problem (threat) they are now pretending to fix. When someone comes and tries to solve a problem that doesn’t exist, think harder. You may need to do more than just say “no thanks”.
When the ASIC fear campaign started, global Ethash hashrate was 265.8 TH (May 30, date of the article), and today it’s 177.9 TH. Why?
The #1 problem with PoW: It’s open to the kind of social attack ProgPoW is pulling off. If you are loosing on the hashrate, who said you can’t try something creative to fight back?
[Linzhi seems to be] quite small and without much influence
True, and good. PoW is a service to the network.
For instance miners coming onto the dev calls to lobby for this and being treated as just normal concerned community members.
Have you found out the identities of Mr. Def and Mr. Else?
Does the community agree with the verification slowdown due to ProgPoW and its impact on light clients?
ProgPoW was kicked off by Nvidia, initially staffed with about 15 people in total. It seems to be a rather standard attempt by Nvidia to control a market using proven marketing. Forget what they say about being volunteers and the fake disclaimers under their articles.
attacks from ASIC miners rather than external actors.
You mean “ASIC miners” as in people already running Bitmain E3 today?
Hashrate is impartial, you always want the hashrate distributed between as many different parties as possible (logically and physically separated).
Maybe you are assuming that someone who is already mining on the network today is less likely to attack than a new/external miner?
In that case you are excluding the possibility that ProgPoW was brought forward by one large existing miner to become even larger, and be able to dominate the network and extract value at will.
The chance of an existing miner with known-good intentions today turning bad is equal to the chance of a new miner joining with either good or bad intentions from the beginning.
doesn’t really engage with the issue of how the cost for an external actor to attack the network is higher with ASICs
Buying hashrate is always the most expensive (and for new hardware also slowest) way to attack a network. From most to least expensive you have: 1. buy 2. rent 3. steal
There are some smart (as in business-smart) ways that are close to #3 such as financing a purchase and then not paying.
ProgPoW is also close to #3 because it steals hashrate from the network by excluding ASICs and thus increases the relative share of the hashrate of the ProgPoW proponents.
ProgPoW thus reduces the attack costs (which I believe is the intention).
I believe the best way to increase (internal or external) attack cost is competition between chipmakers, but I should think about a long-form article to make that point.
If all parties (from chipmaker to pool) are under competitive pressure, noone will be able to accumulate enough profit to dominate the entire system.
There will be no centralization, and attack costs will be high.
What we’re really trying to do is lower the probability and severity of future attacks on Ethereum.
ProgPoW increases the probability and severity of attacks.
This article is the kind of thing we should have been debating before ProgPow got the tentative go-ahead.
You didn’t?
Some comments, quoting the article (KLM for Kristy):
KLM: The equation for [PoW’s goal of preventing network centralization] was a combination of cryptographic math, philosophy, psychology and resource costs inherent with hardware
It is a combination of cryptographic math and thermodynamic competition.
KLM: [ProgPoW] is designed to target a critical part of the centralization problem: specialized hardware.
Red herring. The definition of specialized hardware doesn’t hold under any kind of critical analysis. It’s meant to distract from the fact that GPU mining machines are as specialized as ASIC mining machines.
The GPU chips that are used for Ethash mining today are built into highly specialized hardware, from special firmware to specially tuned memory to special cards to special machines. None of it is resellable or reusable outside of mining.
Rationally thinking about hardware means thinking about cost, hashrate and power consumption.
Then there is also order lead time and reliability, but they seem to be of lesser importance in the Ethereum PoW context.
KLM: Specialization comes from removing unnecessary parts of hardware
Contradicts her own F1 racing car example later on. If you keep removing from a 4WD, will you eventually have an F1 car?
Specialization comes from designing a machine with only one goal in mind.
KLM: When people talk about ASIC resistance, what they really mean is “centralization resistance”. That’s an important distinction to make, because the problem isn’t the hardware itself — it’s the companies and incentives behind it.
Yes. What are the incentives of Core Scientific?
KLM: network security is relative to the amount of energy spent
Network security is relative to the amount of energy spent efficiently.
KLM: Making specialized hardware means you’ve gamed the mining metric in a way that encourages everyone to buy more
Buy more until a maximum is reached. That is called competition, and why PoW is not only cryptographically, but also thermodynamically provable.
KLM: [analogy of a car race between a 4WD and an F1 racing car]
The F1 analogy fails to think through the alternative: If everyone is forced to stay with the 4WD (GPU), the attack vector (the F1 car) is still possible technically. The security (inability to be outcompeted) was reduced.
PoW is thermodynamically provable, or it’s not PoW.
KLM: The energy-to-work ratio is the same. The network isn’t anymore secure.
Who is the judge to check that none of the 4WD got any secret tuning?
The network is more secure if the competition is open between the 4WD and the F1, because an attack vector (the F1 car) was eliminated. And maybe the higher reliability of the 4WD means it’s more competitive to the F1 car than anyone would have thought.
KLM: Bitmain is a corporation, and that means it has a duty: to maximize returns for investors. They’re chasing their incentives, and that incentive is to make money.
s/Bitmain/Core Scientific/
KLM: Creating incentives for the security mechanism to dominate the network growth is just, well, letting the tail wag the dog.
Right, that’s why ProgPoW should be rejected. PoW is a service to the network, not the other way round. ProgPoW is the tail wagging the Ethereum dog.
KLM: This means the first manufacturer of custom hardware naturally has full control of the hashrate
This is already proven wrong by how long it took to bring the Bitmain E3 (and then Inno A10) to market and the lack of competitiveness with GPUs. I did a lot of math around this earlier in this thread.
Even if the ETH coin price would jump to 5,000 USD today, the network would still be secured by the same installed base of over 5 mio GPUs and it would take at least a year or more for ASICs to gain significant hashrate share. Before then even more GPUs would have rushed into the market bringing the difficulty up and slowing down the income of ASICs.
None of this touches any of the software devs’ ability to change anything - protocol, PoW algo, mining rewards within a much shorter timeframe, if they want to.
KLM: By impeding the network (see the empty-block example above), these miners and hardware manufacturers become the attackers by extracting value to the detriment of the network. Worse, their attack on the coin is constant and pervasive — a cancerous element that extends even to blogs and forums outside of the blockchain, where they spread misinformation and fearmonger to hide their motives and damage they do.
Freudian slip.
To be more blunt: That’s the most vivid executive summary anyone could imagine about ProgPoW.
KLM: Specialized ASIC makers and the miners who buy specialized hardware have guided the evolution of Bitcoin into a version of the traditional banking system, where they now hold all the keys.
Double false. First, the author is (today) CTO of a specialized machine mining company, and yet it’s not enough to dominate and profit, so they are trying community infiltration and PoW change instead.
KLM: As GPUs drop off due to loss of profitability, centralization will accrue around specialized hardware creators. Once this happens they can use attacks…
Circular reasoning at its best. How did the GPUs end up where they are today? Why is the “specialized hardware” somewhere else? Who are “they”?
This makes no sense at all. Specialized hardware is a misnomer, Kristy has expressed many times how fond she is of her drive towards specialization, how open minded about ASICs, etc.
KLM: Specialized Defenses: Some would suggest algorithm stacking — found in coins such as RavenCoin, where the algorithms are repeatedly chained in randomized orders. However, Baikal has proven with their hardware (specifically the BK-X) that a bit of silicon area for each algorithm is all that is needed (and a sequencer, to distribute the order)
For RavenCoin, it’s just “a bit of silicon for each algorithm and a sequencer to distribute the order”.
But for ProgPoW, it’s guaranteed to be proof-of-GPU. Really?
KLM: every algorithm that exists today has an optimal ‘design’ in hardware that can’t effectively be surpassed
Obviously false. Is this worth discussing?
You are either designing an algorithm for a chip, or a chip for an algorithm. If you don’t change the algorithm, the latter will always beat the prior thermodynamically.
We wrote a nice 5-step article how we would find a good (the best we can think of) design of a chip for a given algorithm.
KLM: That’s the key to decentralized mining — leverage existing markets which are bigger and already decentralized. When your hardware isn’t specialized, the hardware starts, and stays, distributed.
Doesn’t explain why Nvidia would leave money on the table. Throughout their 25yr history of gaining a 70% market share in GPUs they have demonstrated a ruthless attitude to making money.
Given its history we must assume, and ProgPoW proves, that Nvidia will try to keep mining centralized with them, gamify Ethereum and turn devs into unpaid support staff.
KLM: to adapt the math in infinite and unpredictable patterns
It can’t be that unpredictable, because it has to be verifiable.
KLM: Once you understand how economic incentives help or harm cryptocurrency networks, it’s easy to see how best to keep things truly decentralized
Right. Cost advantage leads to centralization.