Hierarchical Deterministic Wallet for Computation Integrity Proof (CIP) Layer-2

EIPs
2

So, a few comments:

  1. BIP32 was originally designed only to produce secp256k1 private keys. If the output space has to be of a particular size, perhaps it would be helpful to redefine this proposal a bit to parameterize the key-derivation algorithm used to obtain the application-specific secret key. Something like m / purpose' / algorithm' / ... where algorithm dictates what algo to use (instead of being a hard node), or re-interpreting m to be the algorithm type (m := secp256k1) and adding a registry of other algorithms (maybe j := altbn128, which would look like j / purpose' / ...)
  2. What type of Key Safety requirements do we need? This proposal will keep the original master key a secret (which seems like an obvious requirement), but how will application keys be requested? What prevents a malicious application from requesting keys for something it has no business accessing? This will be too complicated to rely on a wallet implementation to get right, or push to the end-user to approve applications to have access to particular paths.

Some other proposals: