Thanks @VincentWu — agreed, and the boundary you drew is the right one: ERC-8263 anchors the commitment; erasure and the other data-subject rights act on the underlying preimage / mutable memory store, never on the immutable on-chain commitment.
ERC-8264’s deleteMemory is written to respect exactly that line — on a public chain it recommends storing only content-addressed hashes on-chain and purging the payload off-chain, so the commitment and the erasure target stay cleanly separated. No scope expansion needed on either side.
Your four-layer framing — 8004 identity / 8263 commitment / off-chain verification / 8264 data-subject rights — is how I’d put it too. A short non-normative note in 8263’s composition section is ideal.
ERC-8264 now has its own thread if useful to link: ERC-8264: AI Agent Memory Access Rights — happy to keep the cross-standard boundary language consistent between the two specs.