Hi,
I’ve been following the evolution of EIP-7962, particularly the shift towards a UTXO-like model for key rotation. While this significantly enhances on-chain privacy by breaking linkability between transfers, I see a critical gap in the off-chain transaction propagation layer that undermines the proposal’s core value proposition.
The Problem: Fragile Privacy via Relayers The proposal relies on third-party Relayers for gas sponsorship and transaction submission. However, in a standard architecture, users submit signed payloads directly to a Relayer via RPC/HTTP.
- Result: The Relayer (and potentially the ISP) captures the user’s IP Address and metadata alongside the transaction intent.
- Risk: While the blockchain sees a “KeyHash,” the Relayer sees “IP 1.2.3.4 is controlling this KeyHash.” This creates a centralized point of failure for anonymity. True privacy requires protecting both the Asset Graph (on-chain) and the Network Graph (off-chain).
Proposed Solution: Decentralized Gossip (e.g., Waku) as a Standard To achieve genuine censorship resistance and anonymity, we cannot treat the transport layer as an afterthought.
I propose that EIP-7962 should explicitly recommend (or include in the reference implementation) integrating a decentralized gossip protocol like Waku for intent propagation:
- User broadcasts the signed
transferpayload to the Waku p2p mesh. - Relayers listen to the Waku topic, pick up valid payloads, and submit them on-chain.
- Benefit: The Relayer receives the message from a random peer in the mesh, effectively obfuscating the originator’s IP address.
Would love to hear your thoughts on standardizing the transport layer requirements for this EIP.