Your EIP’s introduction of random transaction ordering could lead to non-deterministic outcomes, where the same set of transactions produces different blockchain states depending on their randomly assigned order. A critical example is in a lending protocol (e.g., Aave-like), where a price oracle update (Tx1) lowers the ETH/USD price from $2,000 to $1,500, making a borrower’s loan undercollateralized (1 ETH collateral = $1,500, debt = $1,600, ratio = 93.75%), and a liquidator’s transaction (Tx2) attempts to repay the debt and seize collateral. If Tx2 executes before Tx1 due to random ordering, the liquidation fails because the old price ($2,000) keeps the loan healthy (ratio = 125%). How does your proposal address the risks of such non-deterministic outcomes for DeFi protocols?