Not sure if this actually fully solves the problem that this EIP intends to capture, and again I definitely do not have a strong horse in this race, but has the approach of functionality limiting the amount of state change caused by a given usage of SELFDESTRUCT, by way of changing the op-code pricing for the opcode in order to more directly bound state change to the current gas limit, an approach that has been considered?
Could definitely understand that this type of approach would be impractical with regards to the client complexity it would add to calculate gas costs in a way that fits the state-change-bounding constraints that are driving this PR, but figured I would ask!
That is an interesting idea. You could probably set it up so that CREATE2 will allow you to deploy the exact same bytecode to the same address, but fail for all other code.
I’d be concerned about the case where someone expects SELFDESTRUCT followed by a CREATE2 to clear storage, which wouldn’t happen.
Basically, our system uses ERC-1155 to represent Financial NFTs, which are backed by tokens. Say an NFT is worth 10 tokens each, it has ID=10, and a supply of 15. 10 copies of ID=10 are owned by User1 and 5 copies of ID=10 are owned by User2
/**
* @dev Deploys and returns the address of a clone that mimics the behaviour of `implementation`.
*
* This function uses the create2 opcode and a `salt` to deterministically deploy
* the clone. Using the same `implementation` and `salt` multiple time will revert, since
* the clones cannot be deployed twice at the same address.
*/
function cloneDeterministic(address implementation, bytes32 salt) internal returns (address instance) {
assembly {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, 0x3d602d80600a3d3981f3363d3d373d3d3d363d73000000000000000000000000)
mstore(add(ptr, 0x14), shl(0x60, implementation))
mstore(add(ptr, 0x28), 0x5af43d82803e903d91602b57fd5bf30000000000000000000000000000000000)
instance := create2(0, ptr, 0x37, salt)
}
require(instance != address(0), "ERC1167: create2 failed");
}
So if User1 withdraws all of his FNFTs, then User2 will find that his are permanently inaccessible because the contract already exists, as the self_destruct that would have occurred at the end of withdraw was never triggered
This EIP seems to be missing some details that should be considered:
Doesn’t specify whether SENDALL should halt execution like SELFDESTRUCT does
Whether the gas cost should be adjusted
Providing an alternative for replacing code at a given address
Plans for backwards compatibility beyond “get rekd”
The last I find is specifically important. As a platform for building immutable, composeable dApps breaking some functionality which some projects seem to critically rely on sets a bad precedent. There is some small precedent for mutating contracts via social consensus (DAO hack) but the circumstances were very different there.
Beyond harming users of such dApps it would encourage more immutability and upgradeability as devs may want to ensure that they can fix their protocol should the protocol choose to one day break it.
I agree the EIP could use a bit more clarity, but my interpretation is that the opcode continues doing what it did before except the changes listed. This means it will still halt execution just as before. The same thing for gas cost (doesn’t change except for the removal of the refund).
Having SENDALL halt execution like SELFDESTRUCT does make sense, otherwise it could lead to quirky vulnerabilities whereby code from another branch after the <0xff> can all of a sudden be reached from the branch that originally ended in SELFDESTRUCT.
However if the <0xff> opcode is getting such a significant overhaul I’d argue for a reduction of the static gas cost. At least down to the static cost of a CALL (100) or even lower considering SENDALL would not initiate a new call context and also terminates the current context.
EDIT: In fact opcodes that end the current context (STOP, REVERT, RETURN) typically have a base cost of zero so arguably the static cost of SENDALL should also be 0.
If selfdestruct were changed to send-all with the exception of when a contract is created and destroyed in the same transaction, would that satisfy your needs? Does your system only have a hard dependency on this pattern intra-transaction, or do you sometimes create in one transaction and destroy in another (such that you need to be able to re-use that address)?
Does this affect the non-SELFDESTRUCT contract code or storage in any way?
It seems the contract code is perpetually accessible and functional, which kills usage of SELFDESTRUCT as a form of “deactivate” or “disable” switch? (there are of course alternative methods to implement this feature)
Since contract code is currently capped, could we allow SELFDESTRUCT to destroy (delete) code whilst storage persists? In the absence of code deletion, the contract could still be deactivated.
Instead, we add a new Verkle tree that starts out empty, and only new changes to state and copies of accessed state are stored in the tree. The Patricia tree continues to exist, but is frozen.
Would 100% fix the potential issue. Hard dependency is intra-transaction, contracts will always be destroyed at the end of the same transaction they were created
We also make use of CREATE2+SELFDESTRUCT in our production application which has processed over US$1B.
Eliminating SELFDESTRUCT would break our product and require significant re-engineering. It also breaks a fundamental trust that needs to exist between a product and a platform. How can we continue to develop on the EVM if opcodes can arbitrarily be removed?
This is a little terrifying tbh, unless we change the name of the opcode to reflect it’s true purpose (i.e. instead of SENDALL, it’s CONSTRUCTORDESTRUCTANDSENDALL or something). This overloading of the opcode (context dependence) is quite painful imo.
Unfortunately it doesn’t solve the problem of having a strong guarantee that if a piece of code exists at a particular address then that same code will always exist at that address.
