I have, and needed to output it to the EIP. This will be added to the EIP. The source data: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/138M4R1-_zS-OLBsl2VJeN_anfTSCRCFc6EguYUVG-yA/edit#gid=1954833572
5 Likes
Horrible idea. Force a hard fork and let the users decide. This is really simple. Do you want your chain secured by a diverse group of miners or not? Miners getting paid 3 ETH for 10,000 transactions in a stretched block during congestion does nothing for compensation or security. Read the code and understand the issue. Utterly naïve proposition.
At a technical level, this does not require 1559. EIPs are technical change proposals, not a governance system.
1 Like
Another piece of evidence against this proposal is that the main limiting factor for hashrate is the GPU shortage, not the profitability. ETH mining is ridiculously profitable right now, and it’s profitable for me despite my electricity costs being 25 cents/kWh. It’ll be profitable even if miner fees get cut in half, which is not happening. EIP1559 will likely not even decrease the hashrate more than a couple percent, since most miners will still be way in profit mining, meaning they will keep their miners on.
4 Likes
I have a lot of money invested in Defi. I am hearing 1559 is going to jeopardize network security in exchange for short term gains due to deflation and the burning of gas fees. Can someone please help clear this up and explain how this will affect long term holders of Defi tokens. My understanding is as risk goes up from a network security attack, yields will come down. If this is the case I am against 1559 without some kind of network security assurance. This EIP seems like it could be the solution as it will work to reduce risk.
5 Likes
If BR decayed to 1 before the merge was ready, that could cause massive centralization issues with ASICS. I dont believe calculations have been done as to whether any gpu could even break even with power cost at a BR of 1… but it seems unlikely they would, especially after EIP1559 and the difficulty rises in the future. The best case would be to complete the merge asap along with this change, it still decreases overall issuance the sooner the merge is completed, even if BR is increased.
If it decays to an unsustainable level before the merge is ready, then an emergency hardfork and another BR increase becomes necessary. (taking time and effort, and potentially causing danger if the foresight isnt there to do this before it becomes a large problem)
at a BR of 1, id question whether anything but ASICs remain viable, and that not only increases the ASIC centralization threat, but increases the attack threat from all the sidelined gpus who cant make enough mining “regularly” now.
If the timelines too long and overestimates the length until the merge, then theres little loss, the BR would have decayed mildly faster, but the merge came early anyways, and that means less total issuance (less time spent paying miners). (the BR is still decaying, and will likely get below 2 by the time any merge happens, meaning its got a good chance of actually being less total issuance, id love to see someone do a calculation on this to see what would be necessary to make the total issuance the same through the two scenarios)
If the timelines too short and underestimates the length until the merge, then it either A. requires an emergency hardfork, and a BR increase (or some other solution that pays miners more so they break even on power and keep mining) or B. results in centralization of GPU miners on nicehash and other attack vectors (or sold/turned off), and centralizes ASIC control of the main chain as they’ll still make enough at a BR of 1 likely. edit: +(part of the security issue created by 1559 that 3368 attempts to solve)
If this change is implemented, and the hard fork goes without a hitch, theres no reason the tapering rate couldnt be increased, or BR straight up lowered, its much better to do that, using the benefit of our knowledge then, rather than attempting to figure out a perfect timeline now. (imo)
How does it encourage further investment? A decrease in rewards down to an unprofitable level is a legitimate warning, not a sign to invest further. Especially coupled with the reality that the 2.0 merge will happen whenever its ready, doesnt have to follow this timeline.
I’d urge you to reconsider, gpus becoming unprofitable is a huge security threat to the chain. If your ok with an ASIC only chain, i suppose not. ASICS wont support a 2.0 merge. But they will support/not-oppose a fee drop that pushes out less efficient miners. (EIP-1559)
I suppose if people are okay with an ASIC-only chain, so be it. EIP-1559 +DIfficulty rise will make almost all gpu’s unprofitable by august-September… even assuming only a mild increase in difficulty, when in reality ASIC production will further boost this difficulty rise, pushing out even more gpu miners. Centralizing your hash more and more.
3 Likes
This violates pre-established norms of minimum viable issuance. EIP1559 has been informed to miners almost half a year in advance, so has the plan to merge with the beacon chain. The only reason to give in to these condtions would be a credible threat posed by miners - by mining empty blocks, censoring transactions or else disrupting infrastructure. A hard fork is not a credible threat if it coexists with the current network, as most users are not interested in a fork not approved by EF.
Some points for consideration:
- It is too early to conclude whether miners will enter the war of attrition which is mining empty blocks or censoring the network. It is war of attrition because it involves miners taking short-term losses in return for perceived long-term gains.
- Whether these long-term gains exist is debatable too. ETH price will likely drop, and ethereum’s reputation will be tarnished. This harms miner revenues.
- There is yet to be any statement from miners saying they will be peaceful once this EIP is accepted. Nor is there a way to hold them accountable to any such statement they might make.
- Accepting this EIP is effectively admitting miner authority over PoW consensus, which means miners get unlimited authority to propose even more brazen changes in the near future. Unlimited authority includes but is not limited to arbitrary increases in block rewards or block size (gas limit). Miners will then be rationally interested in ensuring the merge never happens as per the PoW consensus, it’ll have to happen in a centralised fashion outside of the proof of work chain
- Giving miners the authority to change block rewards sets a bad precedent for all PoW chains including bitcoin. A similar attack occurring on other chains like bitcoin would further tarnish the reputation and prices of both ethereum and cryptocurrencies as a whole. The facts that we are merging to proof of stake or that EIP1559 is being implemented are not relevant to the fact that giving into miners demands sets a precedent for all proof of work chains. Namely that miners can arbitrarily change block rewards at any point in time if they are sufficiently coordinated.
2 Likes
Following pre-established norms? I thought POW mining has always paid miners transaction fees from BTC to Ethereum. What is the purpose of burning the fees instead of giving them to the miners like it has always been done by your “pre-established norms”? I am a long term investor and I could care less about the games that are being played to try and prop up the price in the short term by creating a market frenzy about Ethereum becoming deflationary at the risk of compromising network security.
Let’s work on solid founded principals and honor what all POW coins have done traditionally in the past and pay the miners the fees for transactions. Price should not be dictated by arbitrary manipulaition of the supply. This will only create short term gains and longer term declines in market confidence. Monitary policy in crypto was designed to be hands off and it seems the new influx of wallstreet investors thinks this is Fed2.0 and can manipulate supply to get what they want out of price. We already screwed up in the beginning with the DAO hack resulting in ETC chain split. Let’s not repeat history again and make the wrong manipulated decision. This time history may not be so kind.
If we want to burn fees then it should be done after the merge in POS. POW has always rewarded txn fees to the miners. 1559 is a mistake with the fees being burned and the miners reaction to it is admirable as they have the best intentions of the network to maintain security. They are doing their job as the arbitors of security. It is the ones trying to change monitary policy before switching to POS and kicking the miners in the balls just because they can are the ones to blame, not the miners.
7 Likes
“Minimum viable issuance” supercedes “pay all transaction fees to miners”
Minimum viable issuance has always been ethereum’s policy
I am a smaller Miner and am for this EIP 3368.
Only 119 MH 24/7.
The Devs never said tx fees will go down for end users with EIP-1559. Like you said more even.
1 Like
I hear everyone saying that ethereum operates on “minimal viable issuance,” and do generally agree with that. However, the fight over eip-1559 is breeding major toxicity within the ethereum community - the worst in years. People are picking sides, leaving for competitive blockchains, ethereum’s reputation is taking a hit, and there is a serious chance that network hashrate and security could fall off in a dangerous way before POS is ready. This influences my perception of what is minimally viable, as having a healthy community is very much worth paying for.
We should not play with fire here. There is no need to throw miners under the bus for (potential) increase in eth price. The reward is not worth the risk. Mining needs to remain profitable and attractive until the POS shift is ready (and I mean ready, not rushed through without essential features) and this is one of the only viable ways achieve that.
6 Likes
Eip-1559 is a subsidy from miners to users, this balances that out.
1 Like
As far as I know the merge is looking to be 1 to 2 years away.
1 Like
Isn’t that a bit hypocritical. So block reward can’t be changed, but fee structure can? Cutting revenue from miners with brute force and without even trying to really talk it out with them?
You cannot simply change the plane direction in mid flish as you please without a broad consensus. This just show the lack of decentralization in ETH in my opinion. If some simply have the power to change things on a whim without broad consensus then ETH is just a glorified centralized database that is super slow and super expensive.
Also what I find really disturbing is the blatant missinformation being streamed and written about everywhere. Blogs, youtube etc… Most of that is spreading a lot of wrong info:
- Miners will try to 51% attack ETH. Completely wrong. Miners cannot attack the network only the pool with 51% can. And it was clearly stated multiple times its just a show that 51% can be mustered not that any actual attack will happen
- EIP-1559 will reduce the fees. Obviously this is wrong
- EIP-1559 will make ETH deflationary. It might, but there is 0 guarantee that this will actually happen. If you really understand the fee structure and economics of ETH its very unlikely it will become deflationary.
My biggest gripe with all this is that there is tons of people not really understandting the PoW or the ETH project in general at the technical level. They simply dream of short term pumps and gains disregarding the important things. I do hope this will not backfire back badly.
9 Likes
I seriously doubt ETH will go PoS sooner then in 2 years. You can multiply everything in ETH development cycle x4 and get a realistic target date. If I remember correctly ETH should be PoS in 2017. We are in 2021 if noone noticed. So I think its safe to not assume anything here.
8 Likes
What is the standing charter of Ethereum was founded on? Minimum viable issuance
What are the Security concerns of the Network protocol? 51% attack.
What would be user experience concerns of the platform? Hard to move ETH (transaction/gas fees), UX
What is the market story effects for
Defi: Hard to Move Money.
Miners: Security/Participation on the network, Increase/Drop in block reward / gas fees / Difficulty (shock) vs (gradual)
Asic/GPU providers: Hardware shortage, secondary markets 2x-4x above MSRP, New Nanometer release every 2-4 years.
Etherum POS: Timeline
Participants on the network: Increased demand in participation.
My two cents
Summarizing here to get conversation flowing I believe as long main charter and security concerns are are addressed. Would be helpful to perform a gradual change so participates can adjust their models over time, increase demand in participation, Users are able to move ETH more Fluidly, Network remains secure and no risk to 51% attack.
Hello from Portugal,
Miner here i would like to sugest this if its doable.
EIP3368 asks for 1 ether BR increase what if this +1 would be paid when POS hits?
So we would have 1559 and IF 3368 activates +1 start counting under the conditions @bitsbetrippin said and this would only be paid when POS goes live.
The miners that unplug from ether would lose this bonus , this would have commitment from miners till POS.
This would be seen has a bonus has a handshake part ways in good faith from everyone.
IF conditions not meet for 3368 activate and 6-12 months from now POS goes live no increase cost for security.
Is this reasonable enough for everyone?
Sorry for my bad English
Best regards,
Anselmo
How about addressing the actual issue. High fees for users. I am a miner as well as a user. Been here since the nethash was 6 th. When the issuance is down to 1 eth, how much are transactions going to cost then. ? do projection on that.
Why is there no proposal that actual lower fees ? That’s a serious question. instead of burn just don’t charge the user high fees ?
I understand. Devs have a interest in their holding and miners in their hardware. WHAT ABOUT THE USER. The user should come before all else. YOU HAVE ALL LOST FOCUS ON WHY CYPTO WAS NEEDED IN THE FIRST PLACE. Let your greed cloud your judgement.
7 Likes