This EIP incentivizes users to bulk purchase gas whenever the price is low. These mass buyers would benefit a lot more if we combine this with EIP-1559. The problem is that EIP-1559 does not account for slippage. I have already discussed this point two years ago in here (last paragraph). Users are paying for the burden which the previous users put on the network rather than their own. Hence, if we start hoarding gas by making an otherwise under-used block full, then the users in the next block will have to pay the extra charges while we spend the stored gas gradually. This gets even worse when we realize that EIP-1559 tells us that if we see a usage spike in the current block, then the gas price will go up sharply in the next block. Therefore, rational users are incentivized to pre-purchase gas for the next block, which in turn, makes the current spike even sharper. This is the opposite of what happens if we had considered slippage by simply replacing the gas used in the previous block with the gas used in the current block in the update rule’s formula.