3403 still ruins any incentive to clean up state outside of the same transaction. The misalignment of incentives should offset any perceived gains on the storage-bloat motivation, but with real storage that would need to be rented under any state rent scheme. The concerns described by @thabaptiser have only been addressed in the same-transaction case. Here are some specifically incentivized behaviors, which I listed in ACD.
- Storage arrays should use 1-indexing such-that length-zero is stored as 1 so adding anther element does not incur
SSTORE_SET. Additionally, popped elements should not be cleared for the same reason - UI-prompted approvals should always be infinite.
- When selling all tokens you should leave 1 in your wallet, which will change the “Sell MAX” behavior on most DEX interfaces.
I’m also opposed to 3403’s motivation because I favor elasticity. 4x is the best part of 1559 and as a power user who transacts during congestion I don’t want to see larger spikes.
In ACD, @holiman mentioned that miners have been mining blocks that are only gas tokens. F2Pool clarified this was because this is their default candidate block and it is only mined if they have not yet sealed another.
In ACD it was mentioned that miners may increase the gas limit under 1559 to fight against the base fee. The possibility of 4x may discourage that behavior since they will struggle to capitalize on MEV if 4x exceeded their full capacity. Because of this and sync-time concerns for the node failure case, I don’t expect miners to target the gas limit above 4x their capacity.