Cross-posted from here:
If we imagine a large backlog of transactions whose submitters have widely varying preferences of the highest price they would pay, then I think it should be simple to prove that:
Under 1779:
- The very highest bidders’ transactions may wait a number of blocks until the
BASEFEEincreases to a level that excludes other transactions, making thetipa sort of single-price auction within each block that reproduces all the problems of the current market but with the additional complexity of this one. - Once the price has increased to a point where the highest price transactions are cleared, and the
BASEFEEis going to lower again, the lower-priced transactions remaining will need to wait additional blocks for the price to fall to be eligible for inclusion.
Under the Escalator algorithm:
- The highest bidders’ transactions would be cleared as quickly as possible, and then the lower-priced transactions would be processed. No block lag to discover price, no unfull-blocks-with-pending-transactions, and only one or two parameters would need to ever be shown to the user (
capandmax_duration).