EIP-1559: Fee market change for ETH 1.0 chain

  1. The other key reasoning is that base fee can be sufficient high to ensure that blocks will be not full. As it is not full, due to profit-maximized strategies excuted by miners, they will include any tx willing to pay base fee and a positive tip (no matter how low is it). So every tx willing to pay base fee can be included. (Is is a corrent understand to your arguement?)

This arguement is much important than the 1).

But it is still wrong. As a profit-maximized strategy require a miner just include those txs whose tip can cover his/her marginal cost of gas production, rather than include any txs with a positive tip.

And, marginal cost of gas production is a dynamic value. Theoretically, it will increase with the amount of gas the miner decided to provide at that time. (e.g. When he/she provide the 500th gas, the marginal cost is 30gwei, but when he/she provide the 1000th gas, the marginal cost must be higher than 30gwei).

If wo do not hold the assumption that the marginal cost of gas production is a fixed value, base fee can not tell us any useful information to help users avoid overpaying. They still need to guess, just like in current mechanism